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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study was concerned with bringing together selected legal 
principles which are of particular significance to the public school 
teacher in Oklahoma as he is forced to make decisions of a legal nature 
in the practice of his profession. The welfarei both of the public and 
of the profession ~ rests upon statutes which specify acceptable levels 
of preparation and otherwise encourage and protect the individual teacher 
in the performance of his duties and functions. Aside from general public 
considerations ~ the teacher should find this study helpful in understanding 
the rights and privileges he enjoys and which he may legally enforce. 
The contents of this studyi while not a substitute for technical legal 
training and experience, should yield a fair measure of general informa-
tion in matters with which teachers are concerned. It is hoped that the 
present study will be a useful document in considering the most important 
aspects of the legal status of the public school teacher in Oklahoma. 
Statement of Problem 
The State of Oklahoma in providing for public education has created 
school districts and delegated to boards of education in these districts 
the right to elect their own public school teachers. The state has also 
delegated to local boards authority over teachersi although in some 
matters the teacher is responsible directly to the state. Relations 
between the teacher and the board of education, and the teacher and the 
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community are regulated either by statutes enacted by the legislature of 
Oklahoma or by some accepted principles or rules of common law. Through 
an analysis of these relationships and court decisions relating to teachers, 
this study undertakes to determine the legal status of the public school 
teacher in Oklahoma insofar as that status is governed by basic law, 
Oklahoma statutes, judicial interpretations, opinions of the Attorney 
General of the State of Oklahoma, and the rules and regulations of the 
Oklahoma State Department of Education. 
Clarification of Tenns 
The definitions that follow in this section are applicable to the 
entire study. 
"The Public School Teacher" in Oklahoma is one who has been licensed 
by the State of Oklahoma to perfonn professional educational functions 
in a public school system. 
''Legal Status" is defined as the teacher's position or standing as 
permitted or authorized by law. 
11Consti tution II refers to the basic law of the state as it was 
originally adopted and as it has been amended. 
"Statutes" refers to laws enacted by the Oklahoma state legislature 
and by the people through the use of the initiative or referendum. 
"Judicial decisions" refers to pertinent decisions by courts of proper 
jurisdiction, state and federal. 
"Opinions of the Attorney General" refers to official written 
opinions pertaining to the public schools over the signature of the 
Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma. 
"Rules and Regulations" include the regulations of the State Board 
of Education and the Local Boards of Education. 
3 
"The State Department of Education" includes the State Board of 
Education, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and divisions. 
"American Jurisprudence" is the second series of Ruling Case Law 
which is encyclopedic in style, similar to Corpus Juris but containing 
only the leading cases. 
"Corpus Juris" is a many volumed series of case law principles 
reported in encyclopedic form. Textual matter provides a running account, 
and copious footnotes give citations to cases in point. 
"Legal Textbooks II are the most recent textbooks dealing with school 
law. This secondary source of school law material was used for background 
study. 
"Assault" is an attempt to beat another, without touching him. 
11Battery 11 is an unlawful beating or other wrongful physical violence 
inflicted on another without his consent. The offer or attempt to commit 
a battery is an assault. There can be an assault without a battery; 
battery always includes assault. 
"Breach of contract" is failure without legal excuse to perform part 
or the whole of a contract. 
"Certificate" is a document designed as notice that some act has 
been done, or some event occurred, or some legal formality complied with; 
evidence of qualification. 
''Collateral attack" is an attempt to destroy the effect of a judgment 
by reopening the merits of a case or by showing reasons why the judgment 
should not have been given, in an action other than that in which the 
judgment was given; that is, not in an appeal. 
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"Common Law" as used in this study, legal principles derived from 
usage and custom, or from court decisions affirming such usages and customs. 
11Estoppel 11 is a bar raised by the law which prevents a man from 
alleging or denying a certain fact because of his previous statements or 
conduct. 
"In loco parentis" means in place of the parent; charged with some 
of the parents' rights, duties and responsibilities. 
"I.aches" is omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and un-
explained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse 
party. 
"Mandamus II is a writ to compel a public body or its officers to 
perform a duty. 
"Quantum merui t" as used here is an implication that the defendant 
had promised to pay plaintiff as much as he reasonably deserved for work 
or labor. 
"Ratification" is confirmation of a transaction by one who before 
ratification had the optional right to relieve himself of its obligation. 
11Right 11 is a power or privilege in one person against another. 
"Ultra vires 11 are acts beyond the scope of authority. 
11Respondeat superior" as used here means that a master is liable in 
certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant. 
Background and Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the laws, court decisions, 
and administrative regulations of bodies governing schools and to present 
an orderly summary of such laws, regulations, and interpretations as they 
affect the legal rights and responsibilities of teachers. 
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Both administrators and classroom teachers find it necessary to know 
the law and regulations under which they operate. These laws and their 
interpretation by the courts and by various administrative agencies are 
found in many sources. The difficulties involved in locating pertinent 
materials have emphasized the value of a compilation showing in one volume 
the substance of the legal aspects of education which affect teachers. 
A study such as this is timely for two reasons. In the first place 
the body of law affecting teacher status has grown until the study and 
analysis of any one question is a formidable task for the public school 
teacher. In the second place the study is timely because the teachers 
are more interested in their status than heretofore. Today, teachers in 
Oklahoma are asking for the reasons behind laws and regulations. Most of 
this is the result of recent activities of the organized teaching profession 
in Oklahoma. For example, the Oklahoma Education Association has sponsored 
workshops in the seventy-seven counties to appraise the laws under which 
they teach. 
Amazingly little has been done to inform the public school teacher 
in Oklahoma of the rudiments of his legal rights and responsibilities. 
No manual has been prepared specifically for the public school teachers 
in Oklahoma. Other professional people, such as accountants, doctors, 
and architects, have legal units in their training courses. The need for 
such a study of the legal status of the public school teacher in Oklahoma, 
who deals with many people and many problems, seems apparent. 
Method and Procedure 
In making this study, a method of approach similar to that used by 
members of the law profession in studying questions of law was adopted. 
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That is, in each area covered, pertinent portions of legal textbooks and 
encyclopedias were referred to in order to obtain a broad and comprehensive 
outline of the problems presented. Such references as were made in these 
works to rules of law applicable to teachers in Oklahoma were noted for 
further study and examination. 
After determining the general outline and problems involved in each 
area to be covered, the next step was to make a study of the current 
statutes of Oklahoma and establish the existence or absence of any 
pertinent statutory law. Notation was made of the provisions of law 
applicable, as well as the absence of such provisions on each point 
covered. Use was made of Oklahoma Statutes Annotated in developing this 
portion of the study. 
Next a study of decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Oklahoma and the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma was 
made, for the purpose of determining the judicial construction of statutes 
applicable . In the absence of pertinent statutory enactments, the 
judicial pronouncement of the rules of law to be applied, their applica-
tion, and the results obtained were studied. 
In this stage of the study, use was made of Oklahoma Statutes 
Annotated for reference to cases decided by the courts construing statutory 
law, and of Oklahoma Digest for references to cases of these courts per-
taining to the particular problem, whether construction of statutes was 
involved or not. With the references thus obtained from these sources, 
as well as those previously noted in legal textbooks and encyclopedias, 
the actual decisions referred to were studied in Oklahoma Reports, 
Oklahoma Decisions, and Reports of the Criminal Court of Appeals. A 
brief, consisting of statements of facts, questions involved, and holding 
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of the court with its reasoning, was made of each case studied. Where 
points involving questions of constitutionality of law were involved, the 
appropriate portions of the Federal and Oklahoma Constitutions were 
examined. 
Opinions of the Attorney General of Oklahoma relative to the problems 
involved here were then studied and the contents and questions involved 
were noted and briefed. Reference was also made to the rules and regula-
tions of the State Department of Education pertaining to the subject of 
this study. 
After exhausting the authorities in Oklahoma (in some instances no 
authority was found in reference to particular problems covered), the 
legal textbooks and encyclopedias were again studied for the purpose of 
determining the general rules of law applied in jurisdictions other than 
Oklahoma. 
After completing the foregoing steps of study, the information 
obtained--statutory law, judicial decisions, Attorney General's opinions, 
State Department of Education rules and regulations, and provisions of 
constitutions pertaining to each particular area of the study--was 
assembled and grouped accordingly. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter I includes the 
introduction, statement of the problem, clarification of terms, background 
and purpose of the study, and the method and procedure. 
The general rights, duties, and limitations of teachers are not 
only outlined and established by state laws but are also circumscribed by 
judicial interpretation of these laws. The most significant of these are 
listed in Chapter II. 
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Chapter III presents the•criteria used in determining whether or 
not an individual teacher 1 s contract is legal and how it is executed 
according to the statutory requirementso The election of the teacher to 
his position must be accomplished in the mode required by the statutes 
of Oklahoma. 
According to the great weight of authority, a teacher is not a public 
officer, is not immune from liability because employed by a government 
agency and is personally liable for acts of negligence while performing 
his duties as a teachero A teacher stands in the relationahip of!!! loco 
parentis to his pupils and must so act as not negligently to injµre themo 
The liability of a teacher for breach of contractual obligations and 
his liability for torts are contained in Chapter IV. Chapter V enumerates 
the grounds upon which boards of education may discharge teacherso The 
discharged teacher has an obligation to seek another position in order to 
mitigate the damages~ and he also has a right to a hearing before being 
discharged from his positiono 
No conclusions are drawn in this study. However, a summary and 
recommendations are made in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER II 
GENERAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIMITATIONS OF TEACHERS 
In the Statutes of Oklahoma and in case studies from court decisions 
are found some pronouncements regarding the rights and duties of the 
public school teacher, together with those that limit his authority. The 
most significant of these are listed here, with the exception of those 
dealing with the teacher's contractual rights, which are treated in 
another chapter. 
However, this is not a complete list of the enumerated rights and 
duties. Other rights and duties are given to teachers as they are 
delegated by their particular school boards or because they are necessarily 
implied in those specifically given. Those listed here have their origins 
only in the Statutes of Oklahoma and in the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma and other states. 
Legal Rights of Teachers 
A right is an enforceable claim to the action or non-action of 
another person. Teachers have certain rights given to them because they 
are teachers. They can enforce these rights against the school board, the 
administrators, the patrons, or society in general. Such rights include 
the right to be absent with pay during illness, the right to make 
reasonable rules for maintenance of discipline, the right to a hearing 
before a teaching certificate can be revoked, and other rights discussed 
9 
10 
in the following pages. There is no presumption that this listing 
includes all the legal rights of teachers. 
Control and Discipline of Child: The teacher of a child attending a 
public school shall have the same right as a parent to control and dis-
cipline such child during the time the child is in attendance in the 
classroom presided over by the teacher. 1 
Jurisdiction Over Children Coming and Going from School: The teacher of 
a child attending a public school "shall have the same right as a parent 
to control and discipline such child during the time the child is in 
transit to the school or classroom presided over by the teacher."2 
It is not only the legal right, but the moral duty, of the school 
authorities, to require children to go directly from school to their 
homes ••• The state makes it compulsory upon parents to ~end their children 
to school ••• the least that the state can in reason do is to throw every 
safeguard possible around the children who in obedience to the law are 
attending school. The dangers to which children are exposed upon the 
streets of cities are matters of common knowledge ••• Parents have a right 
to understand that their children will be promptly sent home after school, 
and to believe that something untoward has happened when they do not 
return in time. No trader or merchant has the constitutional right to 
have children remain in his place of business, in order that they may 
spend money there, while they are on their way to and from schoo1.n3 
Another court held that "a teacher may forbid scholars from 
quarreling and swearing on the way home and punish them for the infraction 
of such rule.tt4 
l Oklahoma Statutes 1951, Title 70, Article 6. Hereafter cited as 
o.s. 1951, 70:6-15. 
2o. s. 1951, 70:6-15. 
3Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495, (1902). 
"neskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. Rep. 387, (1885). 
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Maintaining Discipline: In the conduct of the public schools it is 
essential that power be vested in some legalized agency in order to 
maintain discipline and promote efficiency. In considering the exercise 
of this power, the courts are not concerned with the wisdom or lack of 
wisdom of the act done. The only concern of the court is the reasonable-
ness of the regulation promulgated. To hold otherwise would be to 
substitute judicial opinion for the legislative will.5 
Right to Enforce Discipline: The right of the schoolmaster to require 
obedience to reasonable rules and a proper submission to his authority, 
and to inflict punishment for disobedience, is well settled. It is said 
in the Encyclopedia of :Education that "by English and American Law a 
parent may correct his child in a reasonable manner, and the teacher is 
in loco parentis."6 
Reasonable Rules for Maintenance of Discipline: School authorities and 
teachers may make reasonable rules and regulations for the maintenance of 
discipline. The courts are not concerned with the wisdom or lack of 
wisdom of the act done. The only concern is the reasonableness of the 
regulation. Thus schools have passed rules and regulations governing 
such practices as the wearing of transparent hose, low-necked dresses, 
or any style of clothing tending toward immodesty in dress, or the use of 
cosmetics. 7 
Detaining~ Child After Class: The detention or keeping pupils in for a 
short time after the rest of the class has been dismissed, or the school 
has closed, as a penalty for some misconduct, shortcoming, or mere omission, 
has been very generally adopted by the schools, especially those of the 
lower grades. It is now one of the recognized methods of enforcing 
~lory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164, 134 S. E. 360, (1926) . 
6sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 A 841, (1885) . 
7Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538, (1923). 
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discipline and promoting the progress of the pupils in the public schools 
of the stateo It is a mild and non-agressi ve method of imposing a 
penaltyo However mistaken a teacher may be as to the judgment or propriety 
of imposing such a penalty at any particular time 9 it has none of the 
elements of false imprisonment about it 9 unless imposed from wanton 9 
willful/) or malicious motives. In the absence of such motives, such a 
mistake amounts only to an error of judgment in an attempt to enforce 
discipline in the schoolj for whichoooan action will not lie. 8 
Striking, Threatening, ,2r Abusing Teachers: Any parent of a child 
attending a public school who strikes 9 threatens to strike, or otherwise 
abuses the teacher of such child shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.9 
Pupils with Disease: Teachers may exclude from the schools any pupil 
showing symptoms of any contagious or infectious disease. It is not an 
error of j~dgment or a mistake upon some obstruse question of medical 
science 9 but an abuse of discretionary power 9 that justifies the courts 
in interfering with the conduct of the school board. In a Pennsylvania 
case it was conceded that the board might rightfully exclude the plain-
tiff 0s son if he were actually sick withj or just recovering from, the 
smallpox. Though he might not be affected by it/) yet~ ii' another member 
of the same family were~ the right to exclude him notwithstanding he might 
be in perfect health/) would be conceded. How far shall this right to 
exclude be carried? This is a question addressed to the.official dis= 
cretion of the proper officersj and when that discretion is honestly and 
. . w impartially exercised the courts will not interfere. 
8Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.Eo 605~ (1887). 
9o.s. 1951, 70&6=14. 
lODuffield v. School District 9 162 Pa. 476j 29 A. 742, (1894). 
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Suspension of Pupils: Any pupil who is guilty of immorality or persistent 
violation of the regulations of a public school may be suspended by the 
principal of such school. Such suspension shall not extend beyond the 
current school year. Any pupil suspended from school shall have the 
right to appeal from the decision of such principal teacher to the board 
of education of the school district. The board of education shall make 
a full investigation of the matter and determine the guilt or innocence 
of the pupil. The law provides that the decision of the board shall be 
final. 11 
Teachers' Membership in.! Union£!: Professional_Organization: Membership 
in a:ny association, organization, or union shall not be required of any 
teacher in any school district by the school district superintendent, the 
school district board of education or by the State Board of Education. 
It is provided further that no teacher seeking employment in any school 
district shall be required to sign a contract nor shall such teacher be 
required to make any verbal agreement which stipulates that such teacher 
mu.st become a member of any association, organization, or union.12 
Sick Leave, Hospital and Medical Benefits: The law provides that the 
board of education of each school district in the State.shall provide 
for sick leave for all teachers employed in the district and shall pay 
such teachers the full amount of their contract salaries during any 
absence from their regular school duties for a period of time a:nd under 
such conditions as the board may determine. (In actual practice this 
llo.s. 1951, 70:20-lo 
12o.s. 1951, 70:6-1. 
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right is of little value to teachers because the board of education has 
the privilege of determining the length of time and the conditions under 
which it may be granted.) The board of education may also provide 
hospital and medical benefits and sick9 accident, health and life insur~e 
for any or all of its employees.13 
~ of Absence: Teachers who are members of the Armed Forces, including 
officers and enlisted men of the Reserve Corps of the Army, the Navy 9 the 
Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Women's Auxiliary Corps, or any other 
component of the Armed Fore.es of the United States» including members of 
the National Guard 9 shalli, when ordered by the proper authority to active 
duty or service, be entitled to a leave of absence from such civil 
employment for the period of such active service without loss of status 
or efficiency rating and without loss of pay during the first thirty (30) 
days of such leave of absence.14 
Hearing to be Given.Before Certificate Can be Revokeds Although 
certificates or licenses to teach may be revoked by the State Board of 
Education for willful violation of aI\V rule or regulation of the State 
Board of Education or of any federal or state law or other proper cause 9 
such certificate may be revoked only after a sufficient hearing has been 
given the teacher before the State Board of Education.1 5 
13 · o.s. 1951, 70:6-;. 
14o.s. 1955» 70:6=4(d). 
150.s. 1951 9 70s.2A=4j Subsection 9. 
) 
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Duties of Teachers 
A duty is an act which may be commanded by another, and disobedience 
results in a penalty. Teachers have duties fixed by law which the school 
board may command them to perform. Other laws established duties for the 
school board, some of which may involve duties of the teachers. Under 
these laws school boards have certain powers. Here several of the 
important duties of the teacher are outlined. 
Teachers Looke9.. Upon§§ Exemplars: This higher standard of living is 
deemed essential in the conduct of teachers for the reason that teachers 
are looked upon as exemplars. As stated by one court: ••A teacher in 
the public school system is regarded by both patrons and pupils in the 
light of exemplar, whose conduct and words are likely to be followed by 
the children taught; therefore no conduct or language should be indulged 
in by the teacher which is calculated to invite criticism."16 
Teaching Duty gutside Classroom: The day in which the concept has held 
that teaching duty was limited to classroom instruction has long since 
passed. All of his duties are taken into consideration in his contract 
for employment at the annual salary.17 
Records of Attendance of Pupil: It shall be the duty of the principal 
or head teacher of each public, private or other schools in the State of 
Oklahoma to keep a full and complete record of the attendance of all the 
children in the school district.18 
16Gover v. Stovall, 237. Ky. 172, 35 S.W. (2d) 24.(1931). 
17McGrath v. Burkhard, 280 P. (2d) 864, (Calif.), (1955). 
18 o.s. 1951, 70:10-11. 
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Limitations Placed Upon Teachers 0 Activities 
A limitation is a restraint of action which may be commanded by 
another or by the law and disobedience results in a penalty. The 
statutes and the courts have prescribed a number of limitations on 
the duties and activities of teachers. School boards in Oklahoma 
also have the right to fix limitations for teachers. It is not the 
intent here to report all the limitations placed upon the teacher 1 s 
activities .. 
Unlawful to Teach Without Certificateg It shall be unlawful for any 
person to serve 9 or to contract or agree to serve~ as superintendent, 
principal~ supervisor~ librarian 9 school nurse 9 classroom teacher or 
other instructional, supervisory or administrative employee of a school 
distric.t unless such person holds a valid certificate of qualification 
issued in accordance with the rules and regulations of th.e State Board 
of Education to perform the services he performs or contracts or agrees 
to performol9 
Manual Labor g Compelling a child to do manual labor as a form of 
punishment or discipline is impropero 20 
Punishment must be Reasonable; No precise rule can be laid down as to 
what shall be considered excessive or unreasonable punishment. In 
inflicting punishment» the teacher must exercise sound discretion, 
21 
and must adopt it, not only to the offense but to the offender. 
19 ·. ·6 o.s. 1951» 70. -7. 
20state ex rel Bowe v. Board of Education, 63 Wis. 234, 23 N.W. 
102, (1885) 0 - - -
21sheehan v. Sturges» 53 Conn. 481, 2 A 8.41» (1885). 
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First Aid Treatment~ Teacher~: A teacher is not permitted to give 
medical treatment except in case of emergency 9 but if there is an 
emergency the teacher is under a duty to render first aid to the best of 
his ability a However, a teacher has no legal right to administer medical 
treatment except in case of emergency. This was brought out in a case 
when a teacher immersed a boy 0s infected hand in a pan of hot water and 
held it there for ten minutes~ thereby scalding the hand and aggravating 
the infectiono The teacher was liable for negligence since he had no 
authority to exercise his lay judgment in the treatment of injuries or 
diseases except in cases of emergency. 22 
Teachers Forbidden to Reveal Information Concerning Pupilsg It shall be 
unlawful and a misdemeanor for any teacher to reveal any information 
concerning any child obtained by him in his capacity as teach~r except 
as may be required in performance of his contractual duties. 2j 
Clothing of Teachers& Some control over the habiliments (costume) of 
teachers is necessary in the proper conduct of public schools. Where 
restrictive regulations with respect thereto are reasonable, they will be 
upheldo 24 
Accepting .Q£ Givin_g Pay in Connection with Obtaining~ Position; Oklahoma 
law makes it illegal and a misdemeanor for any teacher to receive or 
promise to receive any gratuity or reward for assisting another teacher 
22Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pao 239~ 24 A (2d) 468~ (1942). 
2
.30.s. 19519 70s6=16. 
2Lio 1conner v. Hendrick~ 18.4. N.Y. 421 9 77 N.E. 612, (1906). 
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to obtain a position in any public school of this state.25 It is also 
unlawful and a misdemeanor for any teacher to give or promise to give to 
any person any gratuity, reward, or commission for helping that teacher 
obtain employment as a teacher in any public school in Oklahoma. 26 A 
teacher would commit an illegal act if he paid for services rendered in 
' 
securing employment for him • 
.A Teacher Not to Serve .fil! Clerk of Board: Oklahoma law provides that no 
superintendent, principal, instructor, or teacher employed by a board of 
education shall be elected or serve as clerk of that board.27 
Employment of Relative Unlawful: It is unlawful for any executive, 
legislative, ministerial or judicial officer to appoint or vote for the 
appointment of any person related to him by marriage or blood within the 
third degree. Two persons are related to each other within the third 
degree if one is the father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, 
sister, uncle or aunt of the other. The appointment of teachers by 
school boards is subject to this provision of Oklahoma law. However, for 
the purposes of this law, a divorce of husband and wife terminates all 
relationship by marriage. 28 
Transfer of Teachers: In absence of a statutory restriction upon a board 
of education to transfer a teacher from one class or grade to another, 
250.s. 1951, 70:6-13. 
260.s. 1951, 70:6-12. 
270.s. 1951, 70:4-24. 
280.s. 1951, 21:481. 
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the board has discretionary power to assign, reassign, and transfer its 
teachers o 29 
Summary 
One characteristic of a profession is that its legal status is 
defined by state law o This is done, usually, because of a profession's 
importance to the welfare of the people and to the state. In setting 
up such legal provisions for teachers the state acknowledges that they 
are a selected group distinguished by preparation, experience and 
essential personal qualifications. It grants to the individuals of such 
a group certain rights, duties, and limitations. On the other hand, it 
expects the individual members of the group to recognize that they have 
certain obligations to society. These obligations have been defined in 
the Statutes of Oklahoma and in case studies from court decisions. 
29consolidated School District No. ~,Bryan County v. Millis, 192 
Okla. 687 (1943) . .. .. -
CHAPTER III 
TEACHERS I EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
Teachers in Oklahoma are generally held to be state employees rather 
than state officers. Therefore, their status is contractual rather than 
statutory. That is, the source of a teacher's right to his job is his 
contract. Of course, a valid contract between the teacher and the school 
district is essential to the existence of any mutual obligations between 
them. 'The criteria used in determining whether or not an individual 
teacher's contract is legal are the same used in determining the legality 
of any contract. Rules and regulations of the board of education, as 
well as those passed after the contract is signed, are considered part. 
of the contract. 
In Oklahoma a teacher's right to sign a contract is dependent upon 
his ability to meet certification requirements. The certificate is not 
a contract between the teacher and the state, but it is more or less a 
commission issued by the state. A teacher in Oklahoma cannot legally be 
employed before he possesses a legal certificate. 
Teachers as Employees Rather Than Officers of a School District 
Much of the professional life of a teacher is determined by the 
definition given his position, whether he is a public officer or a public 
employee; and if he is considered an employee whether he is one whose 
conditions of employment are fixed by contract, individual or collective, 
or by legislation; and if his conditions of employment are fixed by 
20 
·."" 
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legislation whether that legislation creates for him a contractual 
relation with the state or its agent 9 the employing school boardo 
Teachers might intuitively covet the status of officer 9 but the fact 
that teachers are 9 instead 9 employees 9 has several advantages. Officers 
are not likely to have their salaries increased during their term of 
officeo 30 Officers 1 tenure is less secure inasmuch as they often serve 
"at the pleasure of 11 their superiorso Jl Furthermore 9 the length of 
service of public officers is sometimes fixed in state constitutions. For 
instance 9 the Oregon Constitution forbids the legislature to create any 
office the tenure of which shall be longer than four years •. However 9 
Oregon 1 s teacher tenure laws 9 applicable in certain cities of that state, 
were upheld since teachers are employees 9 not officerso32 In New Mexico 9 
where this question was recently raised 9 the court said~ nA school 
teacher employed by a common school district is 1 employee 1 not 1 officer 9 1 
and the relationship between school teacher and the school board is 
contractual only. ,o.33 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has considered these characteristics 
in distinguishing between the two types of servantsi 
A public office is the right~ authority and duty created and conferred by 
law 9 by which for a given period 9 either fixed by law or enduring at the 
pleasure of the creating power» an individual is invested with some 
portion of the sovereign functions of the govermnent» either executivej 
legislative or judicial 9 to be exercised for the benefit of the public 9 
and unless the powers conferred are of this nature 9 the individual is 
not a public officer.34 
30Sieb v. City of Racine 9 187 NoWo 989 9 (Wiso)» (1922)0 
3lstate v. Martin» 163 SoEo 850J (Vao), (1932)0 
32Alexander v. School District No. 1» 164 Po 711 9 (Ore.) 9 (1917). 
33Brown v. Bowling 9 56 N.M. 96 9 240 P. (2d.) 846 9 (1952)0 
34rhe Guthrie Daily Leader v. Ed. ~o Cameron 9 Territorial Auditor, 
3 Okla. 677, 41 Po 635 9 (1895). 
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Another case states that: 
The specific position must be created or authorized by law; there must be 
certain definite duties imposed by law on the incumbent; and they must 
involve the exercise of some portion of the sovereign power. 'A position 
which has these three elements is presumably an 'office,' while one that 
lacks any of them is a mere employment. 1 35 
Al though the position of public school teacher has many of' the 
characteristics of public office holding, the courts have been almost 
unanimous in classifying a teacher as an employee rather than an officer. 
The Nature of a Contract 
A contract may be defined as a legally enforceable obligation.36 
Expressed in other words, a contract is an agreement that is of sufficient 
importance to justify the courts in setting the machinery of the law in 
operation for its enforcement. The essential elements of a contract may 
be stated as follows: (1) Legal capacity on the part of the contracting 
parties; (2) Mutual assent of the contracting parties to the tenns of the 
contract, or what is commonly known as a "meeting of the minds"; (3) A 
valid consideration; (4) Rights and liabilities sufficiently definite to 
be enforceable; and (5) An agreement of such a nature as not to be pro-
hibited by the statutes or the common law.37 
The teacher's contract must conform to all the general requirements 
of contracts in general. To the same effect the Supreme Court has said: 
"Except in so far as controlled by statute, the making, requisites and 
35oklahoma City v. Century Indemnity Co., 178 Okla. 212, 62 P. ( 2d) 
94, (1936). 
36samuel Williston,! Treatise in the Law of Contracts (New York, 
1936), I, p. 1 
37Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago, 1955), 
p. 200. 
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validity of a contract of employment of a teacher in the public schools 
is governed by the rules relating to contracts generaliy.n38 That is, it 
must be between competent parties, supported by adequate consideration, 
be sufficiently definite to indicate what the parties intended, and conform 
to any special statutory provisions that may be applicable. There must 
be an offer and acceptance, communication of the acceptance to the offer, 
and, in Oklahoma, a written contract. 
The law of contracts as it relates to education has remained relatively 
stableo School boards have, of course, no inherent power to contract. 
Since they are arms of the state created for the purpose of exercising 
purely governmental functions, the measure of their contractual power is 
found in the laws of the State of Oklahoma and in them alone. All who 
deal with a school board do so at their peril because they, too, must 
judge of the powers that have been vested in the board. Moreover, the 
rule is well established that, where a contractual power is vested in a 
school board and the mode of making the contract is prescribed, the mode 
is a measure of power, and contracts made in any other mode-are void. 
Thus, where the statutes require that contracts be written, oral contracts 
are void. 
While a contract gives both the teacher and the school board security, 
it is equally binding upon both the teacher and the board. The legal 
rights of each party to the contract are largely based on state law. 
The teacher, because he is an employee rather than an officer, occupies 
a contractual rather than a statutory status. Nevertheless, all statutes 
that are apropos become a part of a teacher's contract, at least by 
38smith v. School District No. 1, Marshall County, 187 Okla. 184, 
102 P. (2d)l31, (1940). -
implication. Not only must a teacher obey all rules that are in effect 
at the time he contracts, but he must obey all reasonable rules which the 
board may enact after he has been employed. In general, the contract 
is the source of the teacher's right to his position. 
The Certification Requirement 
The basic purpose of certification is improving the quality of 
teaching . The state of Oklahoma licenses practitioners of medicine, 
dentistry, law, accounting, teaching, and other professions in order to 
make sure that service is provided by competent individuals. The certifi-
cation laws embody the requirements of the state. The State of Oklahoma 
has established a system of certification requiring teachers to secure 
appropriate licenses for the type of positions to be held. In the 
granting of teachers' certificates the State Board of Education established 
certain qualifications which must be met by the teachers, and then 
delegates to the administrators of the various school districts the duty 
of seeing that the requirements are met. 
The State of Oklahoma has given the State Board of Education full 
and exclusive authority over all matters pertaining to standards of quali-
fications and the certification of persons for supervisory and administra-
tive positions and services in the public schools of the state and shall 
formulate rules and regulations governing the issuance and revocation of 
certificates.39 ~ 
After it is issued, the certificate of a teacher is not subject to 
collateral attack. In other words, it cannot be used as a basis of 
390.s. 1951, 70:2A-4, Subsection 9. 
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dismissal even though the certificate is held by one who is not qualified 
to receive it. The genuineness of a certificate being admitted, it will 
be presumed to have been duly issued, and the officer issuing it will be 
presumed to have satisfied himself of the proper qualifications of the 
recipient and of the existence of the facts justifying his action in 
the matter.40 
A teacher's certificate may be revoked for willful violation of any 
rule of the State Board of Education or any federal or state law or other 
proper cause, but only after sufficient hearing has been given before the 
State Board.41 A certificate may be cancelled if such certificate was 
obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, or if it was issued through error 
and if it is found that the holder was not qualified to receive it.42 
A person may not receive compensation for teaching unless he holds 
the proper certificate, and the courts have ruled that this provision of 
law must be observed. A North Dakota court held, for example, that: 
There is no force in the position that the defendant, having received 
the benefit of the teacher's services, is liable. Such a doctrine would 
defeat the policy of the law, which is to give the people of the state 
the benefit of trained and competent teachers. The law recognizes only 
one evidence that that policy has been regarded,---the certificate of 
qualification. If the defendant could be made liable by the mere receipt 
of the benefit of the services rendered, the law prohibiting the employ-
ment of teachers without certificates, and declaring void all contracts 
made in contravention of that provision, would be, in effect, repealed, 
and the protection of the people against incompetent and unfit teachers, 
which such statute was enacted to accomplish, would be destroyed. Where 
a contract is void because of the express declaration of a statute, or 
because prohibited in terms, the retention by a municipality of the 
fruits of such a contract will not subject it to liability, either under 
the contract or upon a quantum meruit.43 
40Kimball v. School District No. 122 , 23 Wash. 520, 63 Pac. 213, (1900). 
410.s. 1951, 70:2A-4, Subsection 9. 
42.reacher Education and Certification Handbook, State Board of Educa-
tion, State of Oklahoma, Department of Education, p. 62. 
43Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake School Township, 1 N.D. 26, 44 N.W. 
1002 (1890). -- --
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In Oklahoma a certificate has been characterized as a "license and 
not an absolute right. 11 Concerning it 9 the court said& 
The power and control of the legislature over such a license appears 
well establishedg 0A lfoenseo o o ois not a property right, it is not a 
contract, and the Legislature 0may impose new or additional burdens on 
the licensee 9 ° and reserves the right 1to alter the license 9 or to 
revoke or annul it even though the licensee has expended money in 
reliance thereon.o44 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has made an interesting distinction 
concering the eligibility of a county superintendent in terms of meeting 
the requirements for a certificate or licenseo In one instance 9 it was 
held that a candidate for nomination to the office of county superintendent 
who had all of the necessary qualifications for a certificate 9 but who 
did not actually possess the certificate 9 could not file for the office. 45 
In a later case 9 the same coui~t held 9 however» that a county superintendent 
who possessed a certificate at the time of induction into office was 
eligible to continue in office 9 even though he had not possessed the 
certificate at the time of either the primary or general electiono46 The 
latter rule appa~ently has the greater weight of authorityo 
Legal Effect of Signing a Contract Before 
a Certificate is Issued 
Frequently a contract is signed by a teacher and school district 
before a certificate is issued~ but the teacher acquires a certificate 
before he begins his teaching dutieso The question then arises as to 
whether such contract is valido 
L+L.iiodge Vo Stegall~ 206 Okla. 161~ 242 Po (2d) 720, (1952). 
45.Martin Vo Count~ Election Board of McClain County~ 206 Okla. 597 ~ 
245 p O (2d) 714,9 (1952 • 
4~urphy Vo Darnell.I' 268 Po (2d) 860» (Oklao), (1954)0 
The statute provides that a teacher may not enter into a contract 
to teach unless he has a valid certificate and the teacher must have a 
valid certificate at the time of the making of the contract.47 It is 
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unlawful for any person to serve 9 or to contract or agree to serve, as a 
teacher of a school district unless such person holds a valid certificate 
of qualification.48 If a teacher without a proper certificate is employed 
for a position 9 the contract of employment is not bindingo It is also 
unlawful for a Board of Education in Oklahoma to employ a teacher who 
does not possess a teaching certificate.49 
Necessity of Board Action 
It is well established that 9 in order to enter into a valid contract 
with a teacher 9 a board of education must act in its corporate capacity. 
The law contemplates that a board of education 9 in the exercise of the 
discretion vested in it 9 should meet and counsel together. Action taken 
by school board members acting separately is not the action of the boardj 
though all may agree 9 and the district will not be bound thereby. The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma has expressed the rule clea.rlyg 
The power to make or alter contracts for a district is vested in a board 
of directors 9 and in order to bind the district and to make or alter a 
valid contract in respect to the hiring of teachers 9 it is necessary that 
the members of the board act as a board in its capacity as such. In such 
a case the acts and declarations of individual members of the board. 9 
independent and apart 3 will not create a contract enforceable against 
the district. 50 
470.so 1951, 70g6=7. 
480.so 1951, 70g6=7. 
490.s. 1951» 7086=6. 
50school District No. l,2 9 Pottawatomie QQ:gn_j;y: v. Shelton 9 26 Okla. 
229 9 109 P. 67 9 (1910).~ 
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The reasoning of the courts in sustaining the rule as previously 
st~ted is well illustrated by an exerpt from a decision rendered by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri. The Court stated: 
The board of directors of a school district is an entity which can act 
anq speak only as such. The separate and individual acts and decisions 
of the director members, even though they be in complete agreement with 
each other, have no effect. They must be assembled and act as a board.51 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated in another case: 
A public body such as a school board, consisting of several persons, 
authorized to perform acts of a public nature, and to which public acts 
are entrusted, such as employment of teachers for the public schools, 
must perform such duties as a board and to do so it is imperative that 
all should meet together, or at least be notified of such meeting, and 
have the opportunity to meet together to consult over the employment of 
such teachers~2before a binding contract upon the district can be entered 
into by them . 
However , in another case the Courts of Oklahoma held that a teacher's 
contract need not be signed by all members of the board at the same time 
anq at the same place to be considered valid, so long as the board was 
in agreement as to the employment of the teacher.53 In as much as there 
had been a 11meeting of the minds" between the school board and the teacher 
as to the terms of the contract, this constituted a valid agreement in 
itself and the fact that written contract was not precisely executed by 
the members at the same time and place was innnaterial. 
The Board of Education in every case must employ the teacher. Such 
authority cannot be delegated by the board to a superintendent of schools, 
or to any other person. In making such appointment, the selection of 
5lstate Vo Consolidated School District No. 1, 281 S.W. (2d) 511, 
(Mo.), (1955) o 
52 Ryan Yo Humphries, 50 Okla. 343, 150 P. 1106 (1915). 
53school District No. 16 v. Barnes, 40 Okla. 489, 144 P. 1046, 
(1914). 
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each teacher is a matter of discretion vested in the board. A board has 
the legal right to refuse to employ a particular person to a teaching 
position and is not required to reemploy a person as a teacher after his 
cuJ;'I"ent contract expires. 
However, it is considered good practice for a superintendent of 
sc~ools to seek teachers where. necessary, review their qualifications, 
anq recommend to the board such persons for appointment as he deems 
qualified and worthy of appointment. After employment, a superintendent 
may recommend retention of designated teachers, during each time that the 
qu~stion of reemployment comes before the board, or he may recommend 
other persons be appointed in their stead, subject to being overruled by 
a 'board of education. A superintendent of schools, however, has no legal 
authority to hire or employ teachers, and he cannot legally bind or 
obligate a board to employ any teacher on the strength of any statements 
or commitment that he may have made. 
Patrons of a School District Not to Dictate to a School 
Board the Teachers That the Board Shall Elmploy 
The power to hire and discharge teachers has been zealously reserved 
to the school boards so as to guarantee to the public school system the 
benefits of having the school board function as a whole, rather than 
th~ough designated persons with delegated authority, when dealing with 
the vital question of the personnel of the teaching staff. 
On May 22, 1928, the county attorney of Cleveland County, Oklahoma, 
requested an opinion as to the legality of the inhabitants of a school 
di~trict in dictating to the school board the amount of salary to be paid 
each teacher. On May 26, 1928, the Attorney-General gave his opinion 
that the school law "authorizes the school board to contract and hire 
\ 
the teachers for and in the name of the district.n54 The statute does 
not authorize the inhabitants of a school district at a school meeting 
t o dictate to a school board the teachers that the board shall employ, 
and we know of no statute which gives that power to the patrons of the 
district . 
Written Contract Required 
The protection which a written contract affords is considered so 
i mportant by the courts in Oklahoma that it is usually held that there 
can be no recovery of services rendered under an oral contract. In 
Oklahoma the statute concisely states that teachers' contracts must be 
in writing: 
No person shall be permitted to teach in any school district of the 
State without a written contract, except as provided herein for substitute 
teachers and except teachers of classes in adult education. The board 
of education of each school district, wherein school is expected to be 
conducted for the ensuing year, shall employ and contract in writing with 
qualified teachers for and in the name of the district.55 
In Oklahoma, a t eacher brought an action to recover damages for an 
alleged breach of contract.56 The question involved concerned the 
leg&lity of the contract . On June Z?, 1955, the school board passed a 
resolution electing the plaintiff to serve as a teacher. She offered in 
eviqence a copy of the resolution that had been delivered to her and 
further contended that she had been notified of the election in oral 
conversation with some or all of the members of the board concerning the 
5f+opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, May 26, 1928, addressed 
to Honorable Je De Grigsby, Jre, County Attorney (in the files of the 
office of the Attorney General). 
55oklahoma, Statutes (1949), 70:lA. 
56George v. Joint School District No. 2, 317 P. (2d) 251, (Okla.), 
(1957). 
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terms and conditions of her employment. Sha was ready to serve for the 
1955-56 term but was prevented from doing so. She sued the board for 
dam~gas and alleged breach of contract. The state statute requires that 
contracts with teachers must be written and that they must be approved 
,---;~---. --··-·-···· . 
by the county superintendent. The teacher in her petition did not allege 
that she had a written contract, and therefore the lower court dismissed 
her petition because no cause of action existed without such an allegation. 
The teacher appealed to the state supreme court. It upheld the lower 
court 1 s decision, stating that since the law requires that contracts be 
in writing, the petition in an action for breach of contract must contain 
an cµ.legation that such a contract was in existence in order to state a 
cause of action. 
However, in Oklahoma there are a few exceptions to the rule that 
there may not be recovery on an oral contract, on the theory that by the 
acceptance of the services by the district the latter has ratified the 
contract.57 An oral contract of employment of a teacher of a school 
district, even though invalid in that the board of education had no 
authority or power to make such a contract, may be ratified by such board 
by ~ccepting the teacher's services, but, in the case of partial per-
for~ance, the ratification extends only to the period of performance. 
Recovery is allowed on the theory that even though the contract is invalid 
the board should pay for the services rendered and such contract should 
be ratified to that extent. 
57williamson v. Board of Education of City of Woodward, 189 Okla. 
342, 117 P. (2d) 120 (1941). 
Approval of County Superintendent for Teacher's 
Contract in Dependent District 
A teacher's contract with the board of education of a dependent 
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scho~l district must be approved by the county superintendent of schoolso 
U~er the superintendent's specific powers and duties, the Oklahoma 
statute states that his responsibility is: 
to approve all contracts of teachers and other personnel under his super-
vision and to keep on file in his office a co~ of each such contract 
for the entire term the contract is in force.58 
However, a county superintendent is not authorized to decline to 
approve a teacher's legal contract by fixing educational requirements 
gre~ter than those required by law. On this point the Supreme Court held 
as follows: 
., 
The fact that a teacher's contract must be approved by the county 
superintendent serves to protect the school against teachers without 
proper qualifications. However, the actual employment of teachers is a 
matter left up to the discretion of the individual school board. The 
approval by the county superintendent simply insures that salary 
exp~nditures are kept within the approved estimate.59 
If a teacher has entered into a valid contract with a school board 
and the salary to be paid is within the approved estimate, and if the 
teacher possesses the educational requirements as provided by law, the 
county superintendent is without authority to refuse to approve the 
con~act. Sometimes the question arises if the county superintendent 
mS¥ legally refuse to approve a teacher's contract for purely personal 
rea~ons, or whether he may be required to give some reason concerning 
the teacher's ability, character, or desirability. The supreme court of 
Okl¥1oma has held: 
580.s. 1951, 70:3-4ao 
59shofner v. Mercer, 164 Oklao 170, 23 P. (2d) 623, (1933), 
The approval or rejection of contracts, between district school boards 
and teachers, by the county superintgndent is a judicial, as contra-
distinguished from ministerial duty. O 
In another Oklahoma case the court upheld the right of a county 
superintendent to refuse approval of a teacher's contract due to the 
~_Q_onduc~ of the teacher.61 
Al though, ordinarily, it is held that mandamus will not lie to 
compel the performance of a duty by an officer not purely ministerial, 
but in which he exercises judgment and discretion, yet this is not 
entirely accurate; as mandamus, in the absence of other remedy, in 
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an otherwise proper case, may be issued to correct an abuse of 
discretion, or to compel action where the officer is vested with 
judgment and discretion, but his action or refusal to act is arbitrary; 
and, in a case where there are no disclosures~or controvertecll'act-s·· 
to call for the exercise of discretion and judgment, or in a case 
where he must exercise judgment and discretion, but he acts 
arbitrarily, or fraudulently, the writ may be issued to require a 
proper performance of his duties.62 . 
On April 29, 1933, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requ.ested the Attorney General's opinion on the following question: 
The law provides that teachers' contracts in school districts under 
the supervision of the county superintendent must have the approval of 
said county superintendent before they are valid. Our Supreme Court 
has upheld this statute. In a number of cases which have come to our 
~t~ention, the county superintendent is refusing to approve teachers' 
con~racts for next year and giving as his sole reason that the teacher 
in question, or her parents, live in another county, or in another state. 
In other words, a teacher has taught in a given school several years, 
but the county superintendent elect has notified her that her contract 
will not be approved to teach next year in the same school because her 
parents reside in another county. Her work is satisfactory and she has 
been employed by the school board in that district. 
We desire an opinion from your office relative to this matter. We 
should like to know if the county superintendent may legally refuse to 
approve contracts for purely personal reasons, or whether he may be 
r~quired to give some reason concerning the teacher's ability, character, 
or desirability. 
~eans v. Vernon, 108 Okla. 123, 235 P. 163, (1925). 
61shoffner v. Smith, 155 Okla. 43, 7 P. (2d) 655, (1932). 
62Board of Education v. Short, 89 Okla. 2, 213 P. 857, (1923). 
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On May 17, 1933, the Attorney General gave an opinion that if a 
contract entered into between a school district board and a teacher 
was a legal contract, and the County Superintendent had abused his 
discretion or had acted arbitrarily in refusing to approve the contract, 
.. 
th~t a writ of mandamus would lie as held in the case last cited.63 As 
! 
to whether the writ of mandamus would be issued under the set of facts 
submitted would be a matter for the Court to decide in a proper action. 
Oath of Allegiance to be Required for Each Teacher 
and Reaffirmed Each Year 
In the exercise of its power the State of Oklahoma may require as 
qu~ifications, factors other than scholastic, the requirement of a 
loyalty oath.64 The statute requires the teacher to subscribe to an 
oath to support the Constitution of the United States and that of the 
St~te of Oklahoma. The Oath of Allegiance or the Anti-Communist Oath 
la~, enacted by the Twenty-third Oklahoma Legislature states: 
Every officer and every employee of the State, County, school 
di~trict, municipality, public agency, public authority, or public 
district shall within the first thirty (30) days after taking office, 
or within the first thirty (30) days of employment, take and subscribe 
to the oath or affirmation required by this actoooo.Any officer or 
employee of the State, County, school district, municipality, public 
agency, public authority, or public district who fails to take and sub-
scribe the oath or affirmation required by this· Act within the time 
specified in this section, shall forfeit his or her office or 
employment. 65 
It will be noted that the oath must be taken within the first thirty 
days of employment. In the case of a school district, teachers are not 
63opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, May 17, 1933, addressed 
to Honorable John Vaughn, State Superintendent (in the files of the office 
of the Attorney General)~ 
64.aoard .Q! Regents of Oklahoma Agricultural .. and Mechanical College v. 
Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 Po (2d) 131, (1951). 
65oklahoma Session Laws 1953, 51:Section 1, Chapter 1. 
employed for a continuous or indefinite period but are employed from 
year to year.66 Since a teacher cannot be employed beyond the current 
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fiscal year, there is a separate employment each year he performs teaching 
services for a school district. In other words, there is another employ-
ment after the beginning of each fiscal year. This being so, it follows 
that the oath must be taken each year. 
The Oath of Allegiance must be taken by a teacher within thirty days 
after his employment begins in each fiscal year. This being true, he must 
take the oath each year he serves as a teacher, and cannot, by taking the 
oath at one particular time, thereby be absolved from the statutory 
necessity of taking it in succeeding years. 
The Continuing Contract Law or Spring Notification 
Under this provision the contract is assumed to continue in operation 
from year to year unless either party gives notice before a certain date 
that it is to be cancelled. The principal advantage of this plan is that 
the school board must take affirmative action to dismiss a teacher, 
rather than being required to take affirmative action to retain him. The 
teacher, therefore, is not under the necessity of making annual application 
for reemployment. The Oklahoma School Code provides: 
A board of education shall have authority to enter into written 
contracts with teachers for the ensuing fiscal year prior to the 
beginning of such year. If prior to April 10th a board of education has 
not entered into a written contract with a regularly employed teacher or 
notified him in writing by registered mail that he will not be employed 
for the ensuing fi seal year, and if 1 by April 25th, sue h teacher has not 
notified the board of education in writing by registered mail that he 
does not desire to be reemployed in such school district for the ensuing 
year, such teacher shall be considered as employed on a continuing 
66school District No. 76, Creek County v. Bath, 120 Okla. 204, (1926). 
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contract basis and on the same salary schedule used for other teachers 
in the school district for the ensuing fiscal year, and such employment 
and continuing cgntract shall be binding on the teacher and on the 
school district o 7 
Apparently a teacher is entitled to be reemployed for the next y.ear 
unless the board of education acts affirmatively by giving the required 
notice; likewise, by not taking such affirmative action , the board of 
education is entitled to the services of the teacher for the next year 
unless he acts affinnatively by giving the required noticeo 
Evidently the Legislature has some reason for requiring a written 
notice and providing that it be given by registered mail, possibly to 
avoid misunderstandings and to afford a written record of the termination 
of the contract at the end of the yearo Regardless of the reason, however ~ 
the Legislature has prescribed a written notice by registered mail in 
such instanceo 
On February 1, 1956, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requested the Attorney General 1 s opinion on the following questions 
involving this point in the Oklahoma School Code, which provides for the 
giving of notices in regard to continuing contracts; 
1. If a board of education in regular meeting before April 10 calls 
a teacher before it and advises her verbally that she will not be employed 
for next year , will there be a termination of the teacher's continuing 
contract and employment for next year? 
2o If , before April 25 ~ a teacher advises the board of education 
in regular meeting verbally~ or notifies the board of education in writing 
but not delivered by registered mail~ that she desires to resign at the 
termination of her present contract, will there be a terminati on of the 
teacher 1 s continuing contract and employment for next year? 
J. If a registered letter containing a written notification that 
a teacher will not be employed for next year is mailed before April 10 , 
but is not received by the teacher until after April 10, will there be a 
termination of the teacher's continuing contract and employment for next 
year? 
67ooS. 1951, 70i6=le, as amended by Title 70 9 Chapter A» Section 19, 
Oklahoma Session Laws, 1955. 
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In answer to the first question, the Attorney General said that a 
verbal notice that a teacher will not be employed for the next year does 
not terminate a contract. Also, verbal notice or notice in writing (but 
not delivered by registered mail before April 25) given by a teacher that 
he intends to resign does not terminate his contract for the next year. 
Finally, on the third point, the mailing of a registered letter before 
April 10, containing a written notification that a teacher will not be 
employed the following year, will terminate a contract even if the letter 
is not received until after April 10. 
The views expressed in the preceding shall not be construed, however, 
to mean that it is legally impossible to terminate a teacher's contract 
in another way. The Oklahoma School Code provides that a teacher may be 
idischarged from his teaching position or released by the board of educa-
tion from his contract.' And the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held that, 
except insofar as controlled by statute, teachers' contracts are governed 
by the rules relating to contracts generally, and a contract may be 
rescinded by consent of all the parties. It is the opinion of the 
Attorney General that without the formal giving of notices by registered 
mail as provided in the School Code, the board of education and a teacher 
may terminate the teacher's contract, which might otherwise be continued 
for the next year, by mutual consent or agreement.68 
The author finds in other jurisdictions, provisions requiring written 
notice have been held to be mandatory. In a California case involving a 
statute requiring notice in writing to a probationary employee that his 
services would not be required for the ensuing year, it was held: 
Written notice of dismissal of probationary school teacher is 
nec,essary irrespective of actual knowledge by teacher of action of board 
of school trustees in voting for his dismissa1.69 
In a Missouri case it was held: 
680pinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, February 15, 1956, 
addressed to Honorable Oliver Hodge, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
69narbz v. Biggs School District of Butte County, 59 P. (2d), 167 
(Calif.), (1936). 
that even if a teacher made statements that he did not wish to continue 
as a teacher, such fact did not 'relieve the Board of Directors of its 
clear and?Bositive duty under the statute to notify defendant in 
Writingo I · 
It is believed that the requirements as to notification by registered 
mail will be complied with if the registered letter containing the written 
notification if desposited in the mail before April 10. In a North 
Carolina case, the court stated: 
Under statute providing that it shall be the duty of the county 
superintendent to notify all teachers and principals employed, by registered 
letter, of his or her rejection prior to the close of the school term, 
notification of rejection was complete when letter containing notice of 
rejection was mailed to teacher and registered before close of school term 
notwithstanding the letter was not received until after close of term.71 
Validity of Oral Contracts 
The Oklahoma statute requiring that district contracts be written 
are designed to avoid the danger that frequently arises when the memory 
of individuals is relied on to establish contracts. The protection which 
a written contract affords is considered so important by the courts in 
Oklahoma that it is usually held that there can be no recovery for the 
reasonable value of services or goods supplied under an oral contract. 
In Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that because of "the statutory 
requirement that contracts be reduced to written form, an oral contract 
is invalid and unforcible and no recovery can be had. in an action for 
breach of contract.72 
70common School District No. 27 Vo Brinkmann, 233 S.W. (2d) 768, 
(Moo), (1950). -
71Davis v. Moseley, 230 N .c. 645, 55 S.E. (2d) 329, (1949). 
72williamson . v. Board of Fiiucation of City .. £f Woodward, 189 Okla. 
342, 117 P. (2d) 120, (1941). 
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In the same case it was held that "no expenditure involving an amount 
greater than two hundred dollars shall be made except in accordance with 
the provisions of a written contract.n73 It was further held that 
the defendant was without authority to enter into an oral contract 
agreement with the plaintiff; that the oral contract here involved is 
invalid for that reason and cannot be enforced.74 
On March 7, 1958, the State Superin~endent of Public Instruction 
requested the Attorney General's opinion on the following query: 
On February 24, 1958, a board of education meeting in special session 
verbally contracted a teacher for the 1958-59 school year. May said 
board of education meeting in regular or special session at a later date 
but before April 10, 1958, legally rescind its action and set aside the 
verbal contract, or is the verbal contract binding? 
On March 13, 1958, the Attorney General gave his opinion as follows: 
The law on this point reads: '! board of education shall have 
authority to enter ifil?_Q written contracts.with teachers_for_the ensuing 
fiscal year prior to the beginning of such year ••• • · 
Apparently the teacher in question is not now regularly employed by 
the board of education; therefore, his or her contract is subject to the 
underscored provisions above quoted which require the employment of a 
teacher to be by written contract. 
Paragraph (a) of the same statute provides that except as provided 
in Paragraph {e), supra, and with certain other exemptions not material 
here, 'no person shall be permitted to teach in any school district of 
the State without a written contract. 1 Parafsaph (b) of the same statute 
refers to a written contract with a teacher. 5 
Therefore, the Attorney General concluded that, in the situation 
referred to in this query, there being only a verbal contract, there was 
no binding contract between the board of education and the teacher for 
the next year; and this is so regardless of any action taken by the board 
of education to rescind the :verbal contract. 
73rbid. 
74rbid. 
75opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, March 13, 1958, 
addressed to Honorable Oliver Hodge, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
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Thus it appears that~ under the statutory provisions here quoted~ a 
verbal contract with an individual for teaching services is not a valid 
contract and is not binding upon the board of education or school district 
involved, or the teacher. 
Board Regulations as Part of A Teacher 9s Contract 
It is a well accepted fact that boards of education have legal 
authority to adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the 
operation of the school system. In accepting employment as a teacher~ a 
person agrees to perform his labors and duties under the control and 
direction of the board of education and in conformity to the proper rules 
and regulations of the board. 
All rules and regulations of the local board of education~ as well 
as all pertinent state level legal provisionsj are considered part of the 
teacher 9s contract. He is bound by them regardless of whether he receives 
a copy or whether the contract expressly contains such stipulation. Of 
course~ the rules of the local board must be reasonable. The presumption~ 
however, generally favors the validity of a board rulej and the burden 
of proof of unreasonableness falls on the one wishing to void the 
regulation. In briefj a teacher is bound by reasonable rules and 
regulations enacted or adopted before or after the execution of his 
contract. 
To some extent the items included in the contract cover the 
teacher's duties as well as the major working conditions. However~ a 
detailed listing of functions cannot be placed in the contract. The 
nature of the teaching job is such that at best only a generalized 
statement of duties can be made. 
An illustration of the authority of school boards to enforce 
reasonable rules and regulations is found in a California case.76 In this 
case a high school teacher sought relief from a board regulation that 
required each male teacher to be present, in a supervisory capacity, at 
three football and three basketball games each year, for which there was 
no extra compensation. The plaintiff contended he was under no obliga-
tion to perform any duties in connection with athletic activities, as 
there was nothing to that effect in his contract or in the state laws. 
Likewise he argued that this duty was unprofessional in nature, foreign 
to his field of instruction, that it imposed unreasonable hours and was 
not in the school board's booklet of rules and regulations. 
The court refused all of these contentions. It pointed out that, 
by law, the board could make any reasonable rule, not inconsistent with 
the state's laws, and the ·fact that this particular rule was not printed 
in the board 8 s booklet was immaterial, as all teachers knew of it. 
Furthermore, a minute detailing of all supervisory rules was unnecessary. 
The court stated that a law makes principals responsible for the super-
vision and administration of their schools, and a published board rule 
"requires teachers to cooperate with their superiors. n 
In considering the nature of the teacher's job, his obligations, and 
his duties, the courts made an observation that should be read and studied 
by all teachers in Oklahoma. It said: 
••• appellant is not paid on a basis of so much per hour worked. Teachers 
are engaged in a professional employment. Their salaries and hours of 
employment are fixed with due regard to their professional status and are 
not fixed upon the same basis as those of day laborers. The worth of a 
teacher is not measured in terms of a specific sum of money per hour. A 
teacher expects to and does perform a service. If that service from time 
76t.icGrath v. Burkhard, 280 P. (2d) 864, (Calif.), (1955). 
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to time requires additional hours of work, a teacher expects to and 
does perform i too .A teacher's duties and obligations to students and the 
community are not satisfied by closing the classroom door at the conclusion 
of a class ••• All of his duties are taken into consideration in his con-
tract for employment at the annual salar_y. All of this is, of course, 
subject to the test of reasonableness.77 
In holding that the duties in question were reasonable, the court, 
in a final statement, said that such activities should "be helpful not 
only to the students but should be of benefit to the teachers themselves." 
Another striking illustration of this principle was a case origina-
ting in New York City. 78 The board discussed the implied powers of 
teachers' contracts at considerable length, concluding as follows: 
The board grant of authority to fix 'duties of teachers is not 
restricted to classroom instruction.' Any teaching duty within the scope 
of the license held by a teacher may properly be imposed. The day in 
which the concept was held that teaching duty was limited to classroom 
instruction has long since passed ••• Teachers in the fields of English 
and social studies and undoubtedly in other areas may be expected to 
coach plays; physical training teachers may be required to coach both 
intramural and interschool athletic teams; teachers may be assigned to 
supervise educational trips which are properly a part of the school 
curriculum. The band instructor may be required to accompany the band 
if it leaves the building. These are illustrations of some of the 
duties which boards of education have clear legal justification to 
require of their employees. A board is not required to pay additional 
compensation for such services. The duty assigned must be within the 
scope of teachers' duties.79 
Ratification of Teacher Contract 
A question sometimes arises as to whether, if some defect exists in 
a contract, the contract may be ratified by a board of education. The 
issue is usually whether some action of the board has in fact ratified 
a defective contract with a teacher, since, in the absence of some 
??Ibid. 
78Parrish v. Moss, 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 577, (1951). 
?9Ibid. 
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restriction such as the time for making a contract, a board might other-
wise obtain the effect of ratification by executing a new contract 
document. 
The general rule is that if a board has power to make a contract -~ 
but there is some defect in its "execution, tt the contract may be ratified. 
If a contract is void because of a lack of power to make, it is void 
from its inception and it is incapable of ratification. 
In an Oklahoma case a teacher was employed at a ~eating of the 
board of which one of the members had received no notice. The teacher 
taught for one month. At a legally called meeting the board voted to 
pay the teacher his salary and to issue warrants to pay it. The treasurer 
of the district, who had received no notice of the meeting at which the 
teacher had been employed, voted "no.•• The court held that the 
acceptance of the teacher-'s services and the vote to pay him his first 
month's salary constituted a ratification of the contract. 80 
The Court also rules that where an invalid contract with a teacher 
is ratified, it becomes valid from its inception and in its entirety. 
That is, a teacher whose contract has been ratified can recover not only 
for the time he has.,·ta.ught but for the full time stipulated in the 
contract. A board of education cannot accept in part and reject in part 
the services of a teachero And it is not necessary, as a rule, that the 
board take formal action, such as ratifying the contract by resolutiono 
The mere acceptance of the services of a teacher, after a knowledge of 
all the material facts, is sufficient. 
In other words, there is a tendency on the part of the courts to 
SO~ v. Humphries, 50 Okla. 343, 150 Po 1106, {1915). 
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refuse to allow one party of an invalid contract to profit at the expense 
of the other. In taking this view an Arizona court declared: 
••• trustees and the employees alike should observe it (the statute). 
It is only because of the unfairness of permitting the school district 
to accept the employee's labor and services and the benefits therefrom 
without compensation of s~ch employee that the doctrine of ratification 
is allowed to be invoked. l 
A teacher can demand recovery upon quantum meruit in the contract 
unless he began teaching without a certificate or in some other way 
e~tered upon a contract contrary to statute. In the ratification of a 
contract which is not contrary to the statutes or otherwise illegal there 
is established an implied contract which makes effective all the terms of 
the original contract. 
The doctrine of ratification does not apply, however, to contracts 
which a board of education had no authority to make in the first instance. 
In this connection the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held: 
In so far as it authorizes the school board of an independent district 
to supply a superintendent for three years in violative of the state 
constitution, and a contract entered into in March, employing a superin-
tendent for a term of three years beginning the following September, is 
invalid and creates unlegal liability against the school district. 
A contract employing a school superintendent cannot be ratified 
at a time when it cannot be legally entered into.82 
The Teacher's Use of Shop Equipment for Personal Use 
as Part of Compensation 
On August 28, 1939, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
asked for an opinion on the following inquiry: 
81school District No.£, Apache County v. Whiting, 79 P. (2d) 958, 
(Ariz • ) , ( 19 38) • 
82nuy-gan v. Independent School District No • ..22., 182 Okla. 385, 
77 P. ( 2d 1117, (19 38) • 
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May a Board of Education legally enter into a contract with a teacher 
of manual training, under which the teacher would be paid a fixed sum in 
cash for his services and, in addition, would be permitted to use shop 
equipment in his spare time for personal use or for private gain, it 
being understood and stated in the contract that such privilege would be 
a part of his compensation for his services to the school? Would it be 
legally possible for the board to rent this teacher the school shop 
equipment which he would use for private purposes and profit at times 
when its use would not interfere with the normal operation of the school? 
On September 19, 19.39, the Attorney Lreneral advised that the statute 
concerning payment to teachers specifies money payment--••wages 11 and 
"salary." Furthermore, he was of the opinion that school equipment, 
bought with public funds and for public purposes, should not be rented 
out for commercial use.83 
Penalty Clause in Contract Illegal 
Because school boards have no practical redress at law when teachers 
abandon their contracts, they have included in some contracts of employ-
ment a penalty clause to the effect that if the teacher does not complete 
the contract he is required to pay to the school district a stated sum as 
damageso Some contracts provide for the withholding of a stated sum if 
the teacher qui ts b1.efore the end' of the school term for which he is 
employed. C~ .. \-~--? 
No cases have come before the courts in Oklahoma on this question, 
but by analogy with contract law in general the penalty is of doubtful 
legalityo In Oklahoma, penalty clauses have been proscribed by statuteo 
"Penalties imposed by contract for any non-performance thereof are 
void. tt84 
8
.3opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, September 19, 19.36, 
addressed to Honorable'A. L. Crable, State ,Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
84oos. 1951, 15: 21.3. 
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in quoting the above statute said: 
Our statutes are in substantial harmon;y with the general rule of 
law that the courts prefer, where practicable, to give an actual rather 
than an agreed compensation to the party injured by breach of contract; 
actual compensation being the favorite, as it is the fundamental principle 
of law governing redress for civil injuries. Recognizing the justness of 
the rule, no doubt the Legislature condemns as void to that .extent all 
contracts which attempt to fix a compensation in anticipation of a 
breach thereof, unles~ it would be impracticable or extremely difficult 
to fix actual damage.85 
On August 25, 1954, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requested the Attorney General I s opinion as to the 11legali ty11 of ·including 
in a teacher 9s contract the following stipulation: 
That 10% of yearly salary is to be withheld in reserve until end of 
contract yea:r, and if teacher does not finish teaching of full contracted 
year, he or she would automatically lose the 10% of annual salary. 
On September 1, 1954, the Attorney General gave his opinion that 
there appears to be no statute which specifically controls the items or 
stipulations that may be included in a school district's contract with a 
teacher, and so it is believed that resort may be had to the rules re-
lating to contracts generally. "The statutes of Oklahoma expressly 
prohibit forfeitures except where it would be impracticable or extremely 
difficult to fix the actual damages.1186 
The Attorney General goes on to say that the contractual stipulation 
in question appears to provide for a forfeiture, or a penalty for any 
failure (rega:rdless of sense) of a teacher to "finish teaching" the 
entire contractual yea:r. Even though the teacher fails or is unable to 
teach the last week, or the last day, of the contractual year, he will, 
85:oillen Vo Ringleman, 55 Okla. 3.31, 155 P. 563, (1916). 
86opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, .September l, 1954, 
addressed to Honorable Oliver Hodge, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
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by the terms of said stipulation 9 °0automatically" lose 10% of his entire 
year 1 s salary 9 which might be several hundred dollars~ regardless of the 
extent of damage, or even the existence of any damagel) sustained by the 
school districto 
The Attorney General concludesl) therefore, that said stipulation is 
invalid insofar as it provides that the teacher will 11automaticallyen 
lose 10% of his entire annual salary if he naoes not finish teaching of 
full contracted yeari, 0 and is in violation of the Oklahoma statutes which 
provide that penalties imposed by contract for non-performance are voido 87 
Right of Teacher to Salary When School is Annexed 
to Another District 
An annexing district is liable for a valid contract with a teacher 
entered into by the annexed district before the annexation 9 subject to a 
reduction in the amount thereof to the extent that compensation might be 
earned by the teacher elsewhere~ if the teacher does not perform services 
for the annexing districto If a contract was in all respects regularly 
executed and approved by the county superintendent it constitutes a 
valid contractual obligation of the annexing district for the ensuing 
year. 
On this point the Supreme Court of Oklahoma heldg 
Where an entire school district is annexed to another district or 
districts, and the statutes in effect at the time of annexation provide 
that the said annexing district or districts shall assume the obligation 
of the said annexed district 9 the annexing districts are obligated to 
perform, and liable for failure to perform a teacher 9s contract which 
was a valid ~bligation of the annexed district at the time of such 
annexation.8 
··---~----·---·-·~·------~. . ------~·-···-
87Ibid. 
S8School District No. tf) 9 Ellis County v. Crabtree~ 146 Oklao 1979 
294 Po 171, (19:30). -
In this particular case, a school district entered into a contract 
with a school teacher for the then current school year. The contract 
provided that the district should not be liable for any amount of 
difference between the amount of the contract and the a.mount of the 
estimate made and approved. The contracting districts had no approved 
estimate at the time this district was annexed to another district after 
the maldng of said contract. The court notes its view that the laws 
then in effect provided that the annexing district became liable for all 
the liabilities of the annexed district except bonded indebtedness. 
: '.- ... :. " ' ·:~: : '..._., .,~-: . 
••• Where the property is annexed to the consolidated school district 
after the beginning of a fiscal year and prior to the approval of an 
estimate of the attached school district, the approval of the estimate 
of the consolidated school district and the making of an appropriation 
for the consolidated school district operate to make effective a valid 
school teacher's contract made with the school district annexed. 
Under the facts shown by the record in this case, the approval of 
the estimate for consolidated school district No. 3 and the making of the 
appropriation for that school district £or teachers' salaries operated 
to make the plaintiff'~ contract effective and, binding upon consolidated 
school district No. 3. 9 
At the time of the decision in this case, a school district was not 
authorized to make a contract with a teacher for an ensuing fiscal year 
under Article 26, Sec. 10, Oklahoma Constitution as it then read; however, 
since the amendment of this section of the Constitution, and the enact-
ment of legislation vitalizing the amendment, a school district has been 
authorized to make such a contract for the fiscal year immediately 
following the fiscal year during which the contract is made. 
On November 21, 1956, the County Attorney of Jackson County 
requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether the receiving 
(annexing) districts are liable under the terms of the said contract for 
.... -~--
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the monthly salary provided therein. On November 30, 1956, the Attorney 
General gave his opinion that the annexing districts would be obligated 
to perform and liable for their failure to perform the terms of the 
contract.90 
Right of Teacher to Salary When All Children are Transferred 
to Other Schools 
On June 26, 1956, the County Attorney of Canadian County asked the 
Attorney General's opinion on the following question: 
On May 29, 1956, the School Board of Dependent School District No. 51 
of Canadian County made a contract with its teacher for the .ensuing year. 
A majority vote of the school district electors having children eligible 
to attend school in the grades offered, voted to transfer all of the 
children eligible to attend school in the grades offered in Dependent 
School District No. 51, to other schools in the County. 
Under such facts is the School Board of Dependent District No. 51 
liable to the teacher under its contract? 
On June 28, 1956, the Attorney General gave an opinion that Dependent 
School District No. 51 is liable to the teacher mentioned by you under 
the contract of employment refeITed to in your letter.91 
Right of Teacher to Salary When School Closed 
Because all Children Moved 
On September 7, 1937, the County Attorney at Taloga asked the Attorney 
General whether a teacher could hold the school district to a contract 
and collect salary when all children of school age had moved from the 
district. 
90opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, November 30, 1956, 
addressed to Honorable Ross Rutherford, County Attorney, Jackson County 
(in the files of the office of the Attorney General}. 
91 Opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, June 28, 1956, 
addressed to Honorable Roy M. Faubion, County Attorney, Canadian County., 
(in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
On September 10, 1937, the Attorney General replied that it was 
important to know whether the teacher's contract had any provision 
relating to this circumstance. Since none was mentioned, he assumed that 
no such provision had been made in the contract. He went on to point out 
that payment of a salary for which no service was rendered would amount 
to a gratuity. He mentioned two choices that the school board would 
have in solving this problem. First, the salary could be paid. Second, 
payment could be refused, and the teacher could seek other employment. 
In conclusion, the Attorney General felt that it was contrary to the 
interests of the public to spend public funds when no value was received 
from such expenditure.92 
Right of Teachers to Salary When School is Closed 
When schools have been closed because of an epidemic, destruction 
of building, fire, or other events which make it impossible to conduct 
schools, there naturally arises a question as to the rights of teachers 
who are thus given an enforced vacation and prevented from performing 
their contract. Should the closing of school be a direct result of an 
act of God or a public enemy, or the passage of a law which makes the 
performance of the contract illegal, the board is usually not liable for 
the period thus affected. It has been held, however, that fire is not a 
fortuitous event which excused the board from liability.93 It is also 
the rule that the defense of a fortuitous event will not avail where the 
92apinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, September 10, 1937, 
addressed to Honorable J. W. Wilcox, County Attorney, Taloga, Oklahoma 
(in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
93i-rughes v. Grant Parish School Board, 145 So. 794, (La.), (1933). 
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performance of the contract is not made impossible but merely inconvenient, 
difficult, or undesirable. 
The Oklahoma statute states: 
No school district nor any member of a board of education shall be 
liable for the payment of any teacher for the unexpired term of any 
contract if the school building is destroyed by accident, storm, fire, 
or otherwise and it becomes necessary to close the school because of 
inability to secure a suitable building or buildings for continuation 
of school. Teachers shall be entitled to pay for any time lost when 
school is closed on account of epidemics or otherwise when an order for 
such closing has been issued by a health officer authorized by law to 
issue the order.94 
The weight of authority in Oklahoma is to the effect that teachers' 
salaries must be paid during the time that school is closed due to the 
prevalence of a contagious disease. In southern Oklahoma a school was 
closed by the board of health acting under authority conferred by statute 
on account of an epidemic of smallpox, and a teacher sued for his salary 
for the time the school was closed.95 The board of education set up as 
a defense that the school was closed by the board of health having legal 
authority to do so, that such order rendered the performance of the 
contract illegal for both parties, and that no recovery could be had for 
the time the school was closed. The court held that, in the absence of 
a stipulation in the contract that the plaintiff should have no compensa-
tion during the time the school was suspended by the board of heal th, 
the district was liable. 
Right of Teachers to be Paid for Extra Days When School 
Closed on Account of Flood 
On February 7, 1941, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requested the Attorney General's opinion on the following inquiry: 
94o.s. 1951, 70:6-2. 
95J3oard ofEducationv. Couch, 630kla. 65, 162P. 485 (1917). 
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In one of the Independent Districts of Tulsa County, the school 
authorities have been forced to dismiss school for two days on account 
of the flood and for four days on account of an epidemic. Under the 
law the teachers have to be paid for these six days that school was not 
taught. 
I would like to have an Attorney General's opinion as to whether 
this school board can enter into an additional contract for six days' 
teaching in order that this time may be taught and that a full term of 
school be taught. 
In the Attorney General's reply of February 10, 1941, he expressed 
the opinion that the teachers in this case could be contracted to work 
for an additional six days to complete the school year, provided the 
district could provide the money for salaries.96 
Right of Teachers to Salary When School is Closed for Holidays 
On February 13, 1932, the County Attorney of Bryan County asked the 
Attorney General for an opinion as to whether or not the teachers under 
contracts were entitled to pay for the Christmas Holidays during which 
time they did not teach. On February 25, 1932, the Attorney General gave 
his opinion that the teachers are entitled to pay for the Christmas 
Holidays in which the schools were closed. We assume that the vacation 
period was ordered or consented to by the school board in accordance 
with an established custom.97 
Also, The Cyclopedia of ~ ~ Procedure states the following rule: 
As a general rule a teacher's contract for a stated period is 
subject to the observance of recognized holidays and vacations and there 
should be no deduction for such occasions from the teacher's wages, and 
960pinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, February 10, 1941, 
addressed to Honorable A. L. Crable, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
97opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, February 25, 1932, 
addressed to Honorable Roy Paul, County Attorney (in the files of the 
office of the Attorney General). 
the same rule applies in regard to special vacations ordered by the 
school board.98 
Likewise, the State Supreme Court of Michigan said: 
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In regard to deductions for holidays, we are of the opinion that 
school·management should always conform to the decent usages which 
recognize the propriety of omitting to hold public exercises on 
recognized holidays, and that it is not lawful to impose forfeitures or 
deductions for such proper suspension of labor. Schools should conform 
to what may fairly be expected of all institutions in civilized communities. 
All contracts for teaching during the periods mentioned must be construed 
.· of necessity as subject to such days of vacation, and public policy, as 
well as usage~ requires that there should be no penalty laid upon such 
observations. 9 
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that unless it clearly appears 
that a board of education of a city abuses its discretion in giving a 
two day's vacation at Thanksgiving no deduction from the teacher's salary 
should be made therefor, and that an injunction will not lie to compel 
them to make such a deduction.loo 
Summary 
In Oklahoma a valid contract between the teacher and the school 
district which employs him is essential to the existence of any mutual 
obligations between themo It is the board of education, and not the 
superintendent, which has the authority to employ teachers, and the 
superintendent may legally only recommend teacher appointments. It 
should be noted that a teacher is not legally employed until he 
possesses a legal certificate. An invalid contract between the school 
98The Cyclopedia of Law fil!!! Procedure, William Mack, F.di tor 
(New York, 1910), V. XXXV, p. 1102. 
99school District No.~ v. Gage, 39 Micho 484, 33 Am. Repo 421, (1878). . . . 
lOOc(ty of Emporia!! al. v. State ~o rel. Simpson, 52 P. 466, 
(Kans.), 1898). ·· 
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district and a teacher usually may be ratified and made valid by per-
mitting the teacher to enter Upon his duties. In such cases, the ratified 
contract is as legal as if it had been valid in the first place. 
Reasonable rules and regulations of a board of education, including 
those passed after the contract is signed as well as those in effect when 
the signing occurred, are part of a teacher's contract. In addition a 
teacher is legally obligated to perform a reasonable number of outside 
duties under his contract even though the contract does not expressly 
.• 
state that he shall perform such duties. Usually in Oklahoma a t'eacher 
may recover his salary when school is closed if he is required to remain 
ready and able to perform his teaching duties. 
CHAPTER IV 
LIABILITY OF TEACHERS 
If a teacher leaves his position during the period he has contracted 
to teach or fails to assume his duties under a contract into which he 
has entered, he is technically as liable for breach of contract as if he 
had failed to perform any of his other agreements. 
Teachers are given the authority needed to discipline the pupils 
under their direction. They may enforce all rules made by the board 
and, in absence of board rules, they may make and enforce any other 
reasonable rules. A teacher stands in loco parentis to the pupils under 
his supervision. In enforcing rules it is generally held that a teacher 
is not liable, either in damages or criminally, for administering necessary 
and moderate corporal punishment. However, it should be noted that a 
teacher may be held liable if he acts in a situation where he has no 
authority, if he is motivated by malice or if he causes a permanent 
injury to the child. A teacher must use only that degree of punishment 
that is adapted to the nature of the offense and the age of the offender. 
A teacher is frequently called upon to make official statements 
about pupils. These statements are qualifiedly privileged and those 
making them are generally held not liable in damages even though the 
statements they make are false, provided they are not made with malice 
and in bad faith. 
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Liability for Breach of Contract 
When a valid contract has been entered into between a board of 
education and a teacher 9 the question often arises whether the board 
has any assurance that the teacher will perform his obligation to the 
contract. A few teachers in Oklahoma will sign a contract in one school 
district and accept a more desirable one in another district before and 
after the beginning of the school term. What then~ may a board do in 
order to protect itself against the 1111.'jontract jumper? 10 
No cases have come to the attention of the courts of last resort in 
Oklahoma in which a board of education has brought action against a teacher 
for damages because he has broken his contracto Possible reasons a.re 
(1) a teacher would probably not be a very effective teacher if he were 
forced to remain in a teaching position under threat of a lawsuit in 
event of his resignation; (2) it would be most difficult for the board 
to prove the amount of da~ages, (3) the time and expense of a lawsuit 
might prevent the board from instituting one; and (4) most teachers would 
not be able to pay the judgment. 
However 9 teachers may be forced to observe their obligations under 
a valid contract or face the ~onsequences. Although it is impossible to 
force a teacher to teach if he refuses, in Oklahoma, where a teacher 0 s 
employment necessitates the possession of a certificate 9 a board of 
education may seek to have the State Board of Education revoke the certifi= 
cate of a teacher who does not carry out the terms of his contract. 
The Oklahoma Statute reads 8 
••• If upon written complaint by the board of education in a district 
any teacher is reported to have failed to obey the tems of his contract 
previously made and to have entered into a contract with another board 
of education without having been released from his former contract 9 such 
teacher 9 upon being found guilty of said charge at a hearing held before 
the State Boa.rd of Education, shall have his certificate suspended for 
the remainder of the term for which said contract was made.101 
Personal Tort Liability of Teachers 
The most common types of pupil injury are accidents involving 
transportation and injuries received in shop work, in cafeterias, on 
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school grounds, and in gymnasium classes. Pertinent cases which involve 
the legal right of the pupil and his parent to redress in money damages 
for injuries incurred in connection with any school activity will follow 
in this section. 
Negligent acts of the type described here are called torts. The 
Oklahoma Bar Association defines tort as a word from the French, meaning 
a ittwist" or "torque,n or in effect, a 11wrong.n102 In legal terminology 
it means a private, civil wrong committed by one person against another. 
Torts law, then, is that body of law which defines acts that constitute 
a "wrong" and for which the aggrieved person may recover damages. A 
tort may consist of an unintentional act such as negligent wrong doing. 
Court action on account of pupil injuries may be brought by the 
parent for reimbursement.of the cost of medical expenses, or in the 
case the accident is fatal, for the "wrongful death" of the pupil. The 
theory underlying the suit of the parent for the loss of services of his 
children who die or are permanently crippled because of accidents is that 
a parent is entitled to the earnings of his minor children, and if a 
child's earning capacity is destroyed or lessened by the accident, the 
1010.s. 1951, 70:6-ld as amended by Title 70, Chapter A, Section 19, 
Oklahoma Session Laws 1955. 
10%urant (Okla.) Daily Democrat, August 24, 1958, p. 3. 
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parent suffers an economic loss. Other actions may be brought by the 
injured pupil for pain and suffering, but since minors are not permitted 
to sue in their own names, the actions are filed by the parents as "next 
friend.It of the pupil. Some actions are brought against the teacher or 
bus driver involved, others against the school board or the district; 
some join the teacher and board as co-defendants. 
The legal right of the pupil and his parent to sue depends on two 
principles. With respect to the liability of the school district there 
is the principle of governmental immunity; with respect to the liability 
of the teacher there is the principle of negligence. 
The principle of governmental immunity from tort actions stems 
from the ancient pronouncement that 11 the king can do no wrong.tt In 
other words, a government cannot be sued in tort against its consent. 
Several states have enacted legislation which abrogated the common law 
principle of governmental immunity, and gives consent to action against 
the state and its political subdivisions, especially in certain kinds of 
cases. However, the Oklahoma legislature has not enacted legislation of 
this sort. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, however, the 
school district and its officers, the school board, are not legally 
liable for injuries caused even by their negligence. In such instance, 
injured pupils have no redress. 
If a school teacher fails to exercise the duty of care expected of 
reasonably prudent persons in the same or similar situations, it may be 
said that he is negligent, and if such negligence is the direct and 
proximate cause of injuries sustained by pupils to whom such teacher owes 
a duty of care, he is personally responsible in damages. Under such a 
rule, a teacher having charge of children in a classroom, on the 
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playground, on a field trip, or in an athletic contest, or other school 
activity, may be personally responsible for injuries resulting from his 
negligence. 
To a degree teachers are even more accountable for their actions 
than ordinary persons because pupils are in their care, and they have the 
duty of preventing injury as far as possible. '!'he teacher is expected to 
exercise reasonable prudence in the prevention of injuries to the pupils 
in his charge and is further expected to exercise a degree of foresight 
in their prevention. 
Defense in a suit for negligence may be "contributory negligence." 
That is to say, the conduct of the injured pupil may have been below the 
standard of care to which he should conform for his own protection, and 
it was, therefore, a contributing factor in causing his injury. However, 
minors are not held to the same degree of care for their own protection 
as is demanded of adults. The standard required of children is that 
degree which the great mass of children of the same age, intelligence, 
and experience would ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances. It 
is clear that a child's youth and inexperience may increase the precaution 
necessary on the part of the teacher to avoid an unreasonable risk to the 
child's safety. 
A Michigan case points up the possibility of negligent action and 
personal liability which exist in the classroom. 103 In a class in nature 
study, a teacher required her pupils to care for certain plants, some 
suspended from the ceiling in boxes. An eight-year-old girl was directed 
to water some of the plants. Since she was not tall enough to reach them, 
103Gainscott v. Davis, 281 Mich. 515, 275 N.W. 229, (1937). 
--
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she procured a chair on which to stand, and she used a glass milk bottle 
to water the plants. She fell from the chair, the glass bottle broke 
on the concrete floor, and the child was cut severely. The teacher knew 
the child was using the milk bottle to perform her appointed duties. The 
jury held that the teacher was not negligent, hence not liable, and the 
court made the following observation. 
Teachers are liable for accidents which are the direct result of 
some negligence on their part. Whether or not the teacher's act or 
failure to act constitutes negligence is a case for the jury. Efen 
though the teacher may be guilty of negligence, however, she is not 
liable for an accident if there is some intervening action of a third 
party which prevents the teacher's negligence from being the "proximate" 
cause of injury. For a teacher to be liable for negligence is not 
essential that the teacher's negligence be so extreme as to be wanton or 
willful. In the discharge of her duties the teacher is bound to use 
reasonable care, tested in the light of existing relationship. If, 
through any negligence, the teacher is guilty of a breach of such duty 
and in consequence therof a pupil suffers injury, liability results. 
Thus, the test of a teacher's liability for negligence is whether i~04 jurious results should be expected to flow from the particular act. 
Teachers of science, shop work, and physical education have reason 
to be even more cautious in avoiding pupil injuries than teachers of 
other subjects. For instance, a New York physical education teacher was 
recently held liable for permitting two pupils to box, without training 
in self defense or warning them about the danger involved in such a 
sport.105 
In a recent case in California, action was brought against the high 
school district and the automobile mechanics teacher for the death of one 
pupil and the injury of another, charging negligence of the teacher.l06 
l04Ibid. 
105r,aValley v. Stanford, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 460, (1947). 
106.outaher v. Santa Rosa High School District; Rebe v. Same, 290 P. 
( 2d) 316, (Calif.) ,{1955). . 
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The pupils in an elementary class in automobile mechanics brought their 
own cars to the shop for repairs and other work as part of the course. 
They stood near a car being worked on by an advanced student who was 
using a lighted arc torch. The car had been stripped down and the 
gasoline tank set about six feet from the car. As the student worked, 
the sparks of the torch ignited the gasoline tank, and two boys, pausing 
for a moment to watch, were btirned, one fatally. 
The court held that the instructor was negligent. He knew that the 
boy was using the torch, and he should have realized that the position of 
the gasoline tank was hazardous. Therefore, the court denied the 
teacher's defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. 
The boys did not do anything that contributed to their injuries except 
stand nearby, and they had a right to be in that position since it was 
their class period. There was no assumption of risk because such a 
defense presumed knowledge of the risk involved and an appreciation of 
its magnitude. There was no evidence that these boys knew that the 
gasoline tank was nearby, and with their inexperience they might not 
have realized the danger even if they had seen the tank. 
-- An Ohio court has expressed the opinion that a teacher would be 
liable for damages should pupils become ill because he raised a window 
in such a manner as to cause a draft to play upon the pupils and refused 
to permit them to escape its effect.107 
.-_ The seriousness of the teacher's position in such cases as these 
may be gathered from a statement made by a Washington court. A pupil was 
injured while playing with a teeter board on the school grounds. The 
107Guyten v. Rhodes, 65 Ohio App. 29, N.E. (2d) 444, (1940). 
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board had been temporarily removed from its original position and 
dangerously used on a swing. In sustaining a charge of negligence, the 
Supreme CotU't said: ''If the teacher knew it, it was negligence to 
permit it, and, if she did not know it, it was negligence not to have 
observed it. ul08 
Harper has listed a number of kinds of conduct which create action-
able negligence. From his list, the following applications can be made 
to injuries sustained by pupils due to negligence of teachers and other 
school employees. 
A school employee may be negligent because: 
1. He did not take appropriate care. 
2. Al though he used due care, he acted in circumstances which 
created risks. 
J. His acts created an unreasonable risk of direct and immediate 
injury to others. 
4. He set in motion a force which was unreasonably hazardous to 
others. 
5. He created a situation in which third persons, such as pupils, 
or inanimate forces, such as shop machinery, may reasonably 
have been expected to inj'W'e others. 
6. He allowed pupils to use dangerous devices although they were 
incompetent to use them. 
7. He did not control a third person, such as an abnormal pupil, 
whom he knew to be likely to inflict intended injury on others 
because of some incapacity or abnormality. 
8. He did not give adequate warning. 
9. He did not look out for persons, such as pupils, who were in 
danger. 
10 •. He acted without sufficient skill. 
lOf-L · 
-Bruenn v. North Yakima School District No. 1, 101 Wash. ~74, 
172 P. 569, (1918)-:-----
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11. He did not make sufficient preparation to avoid an injury to 
pupils before beginning an activity where such preparation is 
reasonably necessary. 
12. He failed to inspect and repair mechanical devices to be used 
by pupils. 
13. He prevented someone, such as another teacher, from assisting 
a pupil who was endangere1~9although the pupil's peril was not 
caused by his negligence. 
Corporal Punishment 
One of the most important aspects of law affecting teachers is that 
having to do with pupil-teacher relationships. Two of the more common 
phases of relationship that are dealt with by law are the matter of 
control of pupil's conduct and the teacher's liability for pupil injury. 
In commenting upon the control of pupils, Remmlein states: 
Pupils have the responsibility of obeying the school laws and the 
rules and regulations of the state and local governing officials; they 
have the duty of submitting to the orders of their teachers and other 
school authorities. Failure to do so may result in corporal punishment, 
suspension, or expulsion. Corporal punishment usually falls within the 
scope of the teacher's authority; suspension and expulsion are usually 
within the discretionary powers of the school board. In the power to 
regulate pupils' conduct, the teacher stands in loco parentis: that is, 
the teacher is conditionally privileged to take~sciplinary steps under 
.· certain circumstances and for certain purposes. 
Such general authority on the part of the teacher is, of course, 
subject to Oklahoma state laws and regulations and the rules of local 
boards of education. Certain common law principles in regard to the 
reasonableness of punishment, maliciousness of punishment, and considera-
tion of the age and sex of pupils, are factors that must be observed in 
the exercise of the authority of the teacher. 
l09Fowler V. Harper, The Law of Torts (Indianapolis, Ind" 19.33), 
pp. 171-176. 
11
~adaline K. Remmlein, School Law (New York, 1950), p. 2.32. 
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The Oklahoma statute reads: 
The teacher of a child attending a public school shall have the same 
right as a parent to control and discipline such child during the time 
the child is in attendance or in transit to the school or classroom 
presided over by the teacher.111 
One legal encyclopedia states the following rule in respect to 
disciplinary action: 
As a general rule, a school teacher, to a limited extent at least, 
stands in loco parentis to pupils under his charge, and may exercise such 
powers of control, restraint, and correction over them as may be reasonably 
necessary to enable him properly to perform his duties as teacher and 
accomplish the purposes of educations, subject to such limitations and 
prohibitions as may be defined by legislative enactment ••• If nothing un-
reasonable is demanded, he has the right to direct how and when each 
pupil shall attend to his appropriate duties, and the manner in which a 
pupil shall demean himself.112 
Therefore, it may be observed that while a child is at school, the 
teacher stands in the place of the parents, or to use the legal term, in 
loco parentis. In loco parentis, under common law, means that the teacher 
has the legal status of a conditionally privileged person 11in place of the 
parent." Of course, the parent has wider privilege than the teacher 
since the teacher is limited to situations within his jurisdiction and 
responsibility as a teacher. The parent and the teacher in loco parentis 
are privileged to certain conduct in certain circumstances and for certain 
purposes. This privilege includes physical chastisement or other forms 
of punishment for the purpose of enforcing reasonable discipline. How-
ever, if a teacher exceeds his limited privilege, he may be liable not 
only criminally but also civilly in tort action for assault. 
If pupil punishment is excessive or administered in a spirit of 
malice, the teacher is guilty of assault and battery and is liable as 
1110.s. 1951, 70:6-15. 
112corpus Juris, LVI (New York, 1932), p. 1088. 
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any other person would be. As to instruments used in the punishment, 
the fists and a piece of flooring have been held to be improper instru-
ments.113 It has also been pointed out that the right to punish 
moderately does not, necessarily, imply the right to punish until subdued. 
The court appears to be divided upon the liability of the teacher for 
reasonable punishment in the enforcement of an unreasonable rule. It 
would seem that the kind of rule and the other attending circumstances 
largely determine this matter. '!'he weight of authority is to the effect 
that the teacher is not liable for reasonable punishment in the enforce-
ment of a rule the wisdom of which is questioned. 
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in commenting on the right of the 
teacher to exact obedience to lawful and reasonable demands stated: 
Under our cases a school teacher has the right to exact from pupils 
obedience to his lawful and reasonable demands and rules, and to punish 
for disobedience, ·'with kindness, prudence and propriety.•· And where, in 
such case, the punishment is not administered with unreasonable severity, 
a proceeding for an assault and battery cannot be maintained against the 
teacher • •• The rule or rules to which the teacher may thus enforce 
obedience must, however, be reasonable, and whether or not such rules 
are unreasonable is ultimately a question for the courts.114 
In Ohio, a teaching principal was sued for assault and battery for 
paddling an eleven-year-old pupil who had thrown a stone at a little girl 
on the way to school and then lied about it.115 The boy had been an 
epileptic since infancy and had three attacks after the paddling, which 
was rather severe. The day after the paddling the boy's parents took him 
to the superintendent to show him the bruises, and the superintendent 
113Eerry v. Arnold School District, 199 Ark. 1118, 137 S.W. (2d) 
256, (1940). 
114state v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N.E. 266, (1888). 
115state v. Lutz, 113 N.E. (2d) 757, (Ohio), (1953). 
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noted the parents' complaint but took no action. The parents then went 
to the juvenile court, which took no action. They then filed a complaint 
at the police court. 
The court held that the teacher is not criminally liable for severe 
punishment of a pupil unless it threatens lasting or permanent injury or 
is administered with malice. In this case, there was no evidence of 
malice, and the bruises healed in a few days. 
A Louisiana case concerned a teaching principal who was dismissed 
because he administered corporal punishment with a piece of sash cord 
about eighteen inches long after a pupil was absent from school without 
permission. The child was twelve years old and showed the marks of the 
punishment. The parents took him before the school board and showed the 
marks, and then they filed criminal charges against the principal. They 
also sent a letter to the principal stating that they wished their son to 
remain in school, but that if, in the future, he deserved punishment, he 
should be sent home. It was alleged that the reason the parents wrote 
this note was that the principal threatened to go to the juvenile court 
and have the child declared a delinquent and sent to the reform school 
if the parents insisted on pressing charges against him. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that it was not necessary for 
the court to decide whether teachers could inflict corporal punishment 
on their pupils, but it was certain that such punishment, if used, must 
be reasonable and modest; it must not be cruel and excessive as was 
administered to this particular pupil. 116 
On January 20, 1958, the Superintendent of the State Training School 
11
~oueye v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 223 La. 966, 67 So. (2d) 
553, (1953). 
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for Boys at Helena, Oklahoma, asked the Attorney General's opinion as to 
whether the following statute is applicable while an inmate of the State 
Training School for Boys is a pupil in a public school operated by the 
school district in which such Training School is located. The statute 
reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to administer any corporal 
punishment of any kind to any inmate of any penal or corrective institu-
tion of the State of Oklahoma. 
On February 24, 1958, the Attorney General gave his opinion that 
the statute provides: 
The teacher of a child attending a public school shall have the 
same right as a parent to control and discipline such child during the 
time the child is in attendance or in transit to the school or classroom 
presided over by the teacher. 
Also it appears that the above section was and is obviously for the 
maintenance of decorum and discipline in the public schools of Oklahoma 
and was and is intended to apply to children in their capacity as pupils 
in all public schools • 
. A child who is an inmate of the Helena Institution is there in the 
capacity of an inmate, and is subject generally to all rules and regula-
tions of the institutions; whereas, when he enters upon his scholastic 
duties at a public school (whether on institutional grounds or elsewhere), 
he is thereby and by due process of law responsible for a time to the 
school teacher for his control, discipline and deportment, duiing the 
hours of instruction, recital and attendance upon school schedules, 
subjected for the time being to this form of discipline as by law pro-
vided for all pupils in attendance on Oklahoma public schools. 
A child who is an inmate of the Helena institution and who attends 
the school maintained by the Helena school district is, when attending 
the school, there as a pupil rather than in his capacity as an inmate of 
the institution, and is therefore subject to the provisions of Section 
6~15, supra, while thus engaged as a pupil; and Section 31, supra, which 
is only applicable to inmates as such, does not operate to prevent the 
teacher from exercising his right and responsibility to control and 
discipline the child while he is a pupil of the teacher, including the 
administration of corporal punishment to the child. 
The conclusion of the Attorney General was that it is the public 
policy of the state to put the responsibility for the maintenance of 
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discipline upon each individual teacher. Therefore, it would be illogical 
and impractical to deprive the teachers at the Helena institution of their 
authority to maintain discipline in the classrooms and halls of the 
school.117 
Assault and Battery 
In some school districts in Oklahoma local rules and regulations 
forbid corporal punishment, but generally teachers are permitted to 
chastise pupils provided the punishment is reasonable, not excessive in 
view of the age and sex of the pupil, nor excessive in view of the gravity 
of the offense. Corporal punishment cannot legally be administered 
maliciously. If a teacher chastises a pupil unreasonably, excessively, 
or maliciously, he may be subject to a criminal action by the state or a 
civil action by the parent of the pupil. In both types of cases the 
charge would be assault and battery. 
In one assault and battery action brought in civil court for damages 
on account of corporal punishment, a jury trial resulted in favor of the 
teacher. Evidence was conflicting as to the instrument used and the 
severity of the punishment, but there was no conflict on such matters 
as the reason for the punishment, the lack of malice or anger on the part 
of the teacher, the good health of the child, and the absence of a 
permanent injury. 
The court held that: 
A schoolmaster is regarded as standing !E: loco parentis and has the 
authority to administer moderate correction to pupils under his care. 
117 Opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, February 24, 1958, 
addressed to Ernest J. Stocks, Superintendent (in the files of the office 
of the Attorney General). 
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To be guilty of an assault and battery, the teacher must not only inflict 
on the child immoderate chastisement, but he must do so with legal malice 
or wicked motives or he must inflict some permanent injury. In deter-
mining the reasonableness of the punishment or the extent of malice, 
proper matters for consideration are the instri.unent used and the nature 
of the offense committed by the child, the age and physical condition of 
the child, and other attendant circi.unstances •••• There was evidence which, 
if believed by the jury, justified the verdict.118 
A Tennessee court119 upheld the position of the school authorities 
in the punishment of a boy who violated a school rule by entering a 
classroom during recess. The punishment was mild, with a ruler, but the 
boy sued in a civil action for assault and battery. The court held that 
reasonably necessary corporal punishment is within the school authorities' 
powers of control and correction. 
Of course teachers and courts agree that corporal punishment, when 
administered, should be administered reasonably. The following examples 
show that the courts will quickly condemn unreasonable and cruel punish-
ment. In an Arkansas case, a teacher whipped a fifteen year old boy 
twice the same day with a paddle made of flooring. The school board had 
specifically forbidden the use of a paddle for punishrnent. 120 The boy's 
first offense was repeating a riddle from a newspaper, the second offense 
was throwing a paperwad at the teacher. The boy was bruised, and the 
court held that the punishment was excessive. 
The facts in a Connecticut case are somewhat more complicated.121 
A teacher who could not control a pupil called the principal who happened 
ll8suits v. Glover, 71 So. (2d) 49, (Ala.), (1954). 
ll9Marlar v. Bill, 178 s.w. (2d) 634, (Tenn.), (1944), 
120Berry v. Arnold School District, 199 Ark. 1118, 137 S.W. {2d) 
256, (1940). 
121Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A (2d) 377, (1944). 
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to be passing her classroom door. The principal ordered the boy to go 
to his office, and when he refused, the principal dragged him to the top 
of the stairs. Since the boy, who was ten years old and underweight, 
struggled, the principal threw him to the floor and sat on him to hold 
him still. He was alleged to have injured the boy internally. The court 
held that the principal had used unreasonable force, and that the boy had 
a right to resist in self protection. 
It may be concluded from these cases that any teacher who uses 
corporal punishment runs the risk of an allegation that it was unreason-
able. The test of reasonableness applies both to the punishment in the 
first instance and to the question of degree. Permanent injury or dis-
figurement is not always the criterion of the unlawfulness of corporal 
punishment, although some of the older cases held that without resulting 
marks on the body there could be no question of the excessiveness of the 
punishment. 
If there are laws or local school board rules which prohibit corporal 
punishment or prescribe its administration, the teacher is expected to 
obey them. If there are no such laws or regulations, it would seem that 
a practical standard for determining matters of discipline is needed. 
There are certain criteria which courts have laid down in determining 
whether corporal punishment is reasonable or not. On the basis of these 
standards, the courts determine whether the case is to be decided for or 
against the teacher. 1'he characteristics of reasonable corporal punish-
ment have been listed by Stunption: 
It is in conformance with statutory enactments. 
It is for the purpose of correction without malice. 
The pupil knows wherein he has erred and is thus aware of the 
reason for the punishment. 
-- It is not cruel or excessive and leaves no permanent mark or 
injury. 
-- It is suited to the age and sex of the pupil. 
-- It is administered in the pupil-teacher relationship.122 
The teacher or principal who, in the rare circumstances when it 
seems appropriate, administers corporal punishment should keep these 
criteria in mind • 
Liability for Libel and Slander 
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The twin torts of defamation, libel and slander, are a not infrequent 
source of litigation between students and school personnel. Defamation 
has been defined as the offense of injuring a person's character, fame, 
or reputation by false and malicious statement.123 If the words are 
spoken, slander results; if written, libel has been communicated. Every 
teacher has occasion to make unfavorable statements relating to students, 
in reports of conduct, reasons for discipline or dismissal, and in reply 
to requests for information or recommendations. Even if the derogatory 
statements are false, it is quite probable that the teacher making them 
is not liable, since in most of these situations, the law again accords 
a privilege, when the speaker or writer is seeking to protect the interests 
of the school and the pupils. 
The following cases illustrate the extent of and limits to this 
privilege. The head of a school was permitted to state falsely but in 
~ood faith, that a student was deranged, as he was attempting to protect 
122rhe N•~•.!• Research Bulletin, Research Division of the N.E.A., 
(Washington, D. c., October, 1958), XXXVI, J, pp. 88-89. · 
123genry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul, 1951), 
p. 505. 
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other students from contact 1rr.l.. th himo 124 Still another duty 9 to report 
to higher authorities was held to gi Ye rise to a privilege allowed a high 
school principal to communicate to the school board that there were rumors 
around the school that a certain student was pregnant.125 
These privileges are not absolute~ however~ and liability may result 
if the speaker exceeds their bounds or speaks with malice. Malice includes 
spite and ill will and also includes any motive for the publication that 
does not further ·the interest that gives rise to the privilegeo Thus where 
a teacher in Oklahoma was required to report grades and attendance of 
students to the school board~ the privilege wac1 exceeded when be added 
"Ruined by tobacco and whisky ti on the school register opposite the 
student 1 s name. Billingsley was the principal of a district in which 
Wallace Dawkins was a pupil. He kept a register of the daily attendance 
and grades of pupils attending the school 9 and at the close of the term 
he delivered it to the clerk of the school board. Afterwards it was seen 
by various persons. In the register there had been written by the 
principal 9 as a report of the attendance and grade of Wallace Dawkins 9 
these wordss "Drag all the time. Ruined by tobacco and whisky o II This 
was 9 needless to say 9 defamatory and was not 11a privileged communication. 10 
It is interesting to note that libel or slander may be true and 
still be the basis of legal action for defaJnation of character. '.I'he 
Oklahoma Supreme Court stated g 
A written or printed publication imputing roguery 9 rascality 9 or general 
depravityj which carries with it a charge of moral turpitude and degrada= 
tion of character 9 the natural tendency of which is to hold the party up 
124.Everest Vo McKenney 9 195 Micho 649 9 162 NoWo 277 9 (1917)0 
125Forsythe v. Durham 9 270 N.Y. 141 9 200 N.E. 674~ (1936). 
to contempt and expose him to the reprobation of the virtuous and 
honorable, is libelous per ~.126 
The School Patrol 
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School patrols have been in operation in the public schools of the 
United States for more than a quarter of a century. . During this time no 
case involving the liability of a teacher supervising such a program 
appears to have reached a court of last resort. However, the question 
is frequently asked: Is it ttreasonably prudent" to entrust the physical 
safety of a group of school children to an immature classmate? 
Whether or not the teacher in charge of patrols is liable for pupil 
injuries hinges largely on the question of negligence. Negligence may be 
defined as any conduct which falls below the standard established by law 
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. The first 
test for determining the liability of a person for an injury to others is 
the test of foreseeability •. If the classroom teacher or principal, aware 
of the possible risks to patrol members makes reasonable effort through 
training programs, instructions, and supervision to avoid the hazards, 
then his liability in case of pupil injury might not be large. It is 
possible under these conditions that the pupil injured would have con-
tributed to the negligence by failing to follow instructions or simply 
acting irresponsibly. Therefore, under a planned and supervised program 
of school patrols it does not appear that those in charge assume any 
larger legal responsibility than would be present in most school 
activities. However, whether a teacher or other person concerned with 
126oawkins v. Billingsley, 69 Okla. 259, 172 P. 69, (1918). 
patrol operation is guilty of actionable negligence, would have to be 
determined by a jury or a judge.127 
Field Trips 
Teachers, like all citizens, are responsible for any action of 
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theirs which causes injury to another. This is true even when teachers 
are following directions given by the school board and are acting within 
the scope of their employment. Just as the most careful driver occasionally 
will violate a traffic regulation, so will the most careful and efficient 
teacher at some time be unable to keep all his individual charges under 
full supervision. The legal obligation of a teacher to exercise reason-
able supervision of pupils that they may not be injured by accidents on 
field trips, is the same as in other supervisory situations. 
Al though there have been no cases in courts of record in Oklahoma 
involving injuries sustained by pupils while away from school on educa-
tional excursions sponsored by the teacher or the school, some cases in 
other states have established certain principles. All of the cases 
involve attempts by injured pupils or their parents to recover from the 
host plant or organization. No case has been found in which it was 
sought to hold the teacher liable for an injury. 
The host organization is not usually liable for injuries to pupils 
on its premises if they are there solely for their own purposes. It has 
been held that school groups visiting industrial plants and places of 
that kind are mere "licensees" and must therefore accept the premises as 
they find them. 128 There is no duty upon the owner to provide safeguards 
127The .N,o~oA• Research Bulletin, Research Di vision of the N .EoA. 
(Washington, D. C., February, 1950), XXVIII, l, pp. 27-28. 
128Benson v. Baltimore Traction Company, 77 Md. 535, 26 (A) 973, (1893). 
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for licensees, nor does he owe duty to licensees for the careful per-
formance of the ordinary work carried on in the usual manner. 
In Louisiana, a senior high school class was permitted to visit an 
ice manufacturing plant. The class was led across a collection of tanks 
filled with water. When the tanks of water were frozen, the blocks of 
ice were lifted by a mechanical device and conveyed to another part of 
the building. This device was operated along an electrically charged 
copper wire, about six feet and three inches above the walk along which 
the class was being conducted. While walking across the tanks, a member 
of the class slipped, and in an effort to save himself from falling, 
reached up and caught hold of the wire and was electrocuted. 
The parents of the boy sued the company for damages. The court held 
that the company was not liable. The decision was based on the rule that 
the boy was a licensee to whom the company did not owe reasonable care. 
But in holding that the company was not liable, the court intimated that 
the responsibility was the teacher's for taking a group of pupils to a 
danger~us place.129 
On the other hand if the host organization invites the pupils to 
visit the plant, the organization owes reasonable care for their safety 
because the pupils are said to be invitees. In a Missouri case, a home 
economics class visited a bake~ and creamery where a sign was displayed 
in the window which stated "Inspection Invited." The class was being 
conducted through the plant by one of the. employees. An ice crushing 
machine was in operation, and some of. the girls ate pieces of ice which 
they picked up at the outlet of the machine. Later one of the girls 
129 Myers v. ~ Public Service Corporation, 15 La. App. 589, 132 
(So) 416, (1931). 
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returned for another piece of iceJ and her hand was caught in the crushero 
Her hand and arm had to be amputatedo 
The court held that the company was liable because the girl had no 
warning of the danger of the machine and was negligent in not providing 
proper supervision. The court held that the jury could find that the 
girl was an invitee» not a licensee.l30 
( The courts have also observed that permission for a visit or excursion 
-~~L;e).::,i 
given by the parent to school a.uthori t.ie.s does not relieve the teacher in 
charge from liabilitye Many teachers have thought that obtaining parental 
consent to take a child on a field trip was a kind of release and that the 
signing of a permission slip by a parent prior to the excursion waived the 
right of any claim to damages if some mishap befell a pupilo 
The reason that parental consent does not free a teacher from 
liability is that the injured child himself can suew He did not sign 
the paper P and he was injured through the teacher 0 s lack of •treasonable 
prudence--in loco parentis. 11 ) However P it is good practice to have the 
parent sign the slip because it is good public relations. 
Sending Pupils on Errands 
Errands for the teacher are not the pupil Os business in school. If 
a teacher sends a pupil on an errand for some school purpose or for the 
teacher 1s own personal business 1 and the pupil suffers injury while on 
the errandJ the teacher may be liable on the ground that the teacher did 
not act reasonably in sending the pupil. Another serious aspect of the 
practice is that according to the law the pupil becomes the teacher 0s 
l30Gilliland Vo Bondurant~ 3.32 Moo 881w 59(S.W.,) (2d) 679w (1933)0 
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agent while on the errand, and, under respondeat superior, the teacher 
is responsible for any negligent act of the pupil that may cause injury 
to a third party. 
In Oklahoma the common accidental bodily injury insurance which 
many pupils buy under school auspices, indemnifies the pupil, but it does 
not protect the teacher. In other words, a teacher may still be sued by 
a child thus covered, and, if found negligent, faces the possibility of 
paying damages. 
Use of Private Automobiles by Teachers for School Purposes 
The use of the automobile in transporting pupils to interscholastic 
contests of various kinds has resulted in increased responsibility to 
teachers. According to an Idaho decision, a teacher is not only responsible 
for pupils under his immediate supervision, but he is also held liable 
under the 11principal and agentn rule for accidents happening to other 
pupils who may be traveling in the teacher's car. 
In the Idaho case a teacher in a high school asked the coach if he 
had enough cars to transport the football team to a nearby town. The 
coach said he needed one more, and she replied that he might use hers if 
he drove it himself. Enroute to the site of the game, the coacp missed 
a curve, the car turned over, and one of the boys was severely injured. 
The jury found the coach was negligent, and also found that he was the 
agent of the owner of the car and that she was therefore as responsible 
for the damages as he was. In this case as in other liability situations 
the teacher does not enjoy the liability exemption allowed the school 
board as an agent of the state.131 
131 Gordon v. Doty, 69 P (2d) 136, (Idaho), (1937). 
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In a California case, a tennis teacher arranged with one of the 
boys on the team to take five others home each night f'rom practice. Per-
mission was given by the board of education, and gasoline was furnished 
for the boy's car. The teacher knew the boy was somewhat undependable 
with a tendency toward recklessness. One night the car collided with 
another, and one of the passengers was killed. Under the California law 
the district was held liable for the negligence of the teacher in not 
providing safe transportation for his pupils. The teacher himself was 
not sued in this particular case. There is a possibility that he might 
have been held equally liable with the district or in most states 
individually liable for the amount of the verdict.132 
Summary 
Both teachers and school districts are liable for breach of their 
contractual obligations. Most teacher liability cases arise in labora-
tories, manual art shops, and in athletic and physical education classes. 
However, a liability has been imposed upon teachers for failure to 
exercise adequate supervision over the pupils in their classrooms. 
Legally an Oklahoma teacher may inflict reasonable corporal punish-
ment upon his pupils. When pupils are sent on a personal errand for the 
teacher, the teacher may be held individually liable for injury or damage 
caused by a pupil while he is on the errand. 
Teachers can be held liable when conducting children on field trips 
if their failure to exercise reasonable super:vision over the pupils 
should result in their injury. 
l32flanson v. Reedley Joint ~ !!!gh .School District, 111 P (2d) 
415, (Calif.), (1941). . 
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Legal danger for teachers is substantial for teachers in using their 
personal automobiles for school purposes. The same rules of liability 
of teachers in their conduct generally applies to their work in connection 
with school patrols. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCHARGE OF TEACHERS 
In Oklahoma the contract of a teacher may not be terminated by a 
board of education except for immorality, willful neglect of duty, 
cruelty, incompetency, teaching disloyalty to the American Constitutional 
System of Government, or moral turpitude. A board of education does not 
have the right to terminate a contract of a woman teacher who marries 
during its existence. 
The law provides for a formal procedure in reference to the termina-
tion of the contract and provides not only for notice to the teacher as 
to the alleged charges, but also for a hearing before the board of 
education. A teacher employed for a school year, if wrongfully discharged 
I 
before expiration of the term of employment, may recover salary in full 
for the remainder of such term, upon demonstrating the failure to obtain 
other employment after reasonable effort to do so. If employment is 
obtained, whatever amount is earned during such period, must be offset 
against the salary claimed. A teacher who does not challenge the 
sufficiency of the reasons of the board in dispensing with his services, 
cannot recover salary for the remainder of the year as fixed in his 
contract of employment. 
Authority of Local Board to Dismiss Teachers 
It is well settled that school teachers are not public officers. 
They are employees, and such rights as they have to compensation grow 
80 
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out of the contractual relationship.133 The welfare of the schools 
requires that the rights and responsibilities both of the teacher and the 
board of education be clearly defined and established on principles that 
recognize a professional status for the teachers. Both school officials 
and teachers should realize the need for carrying out the full letter of 
the law governing contracts and terms of employment. 
In Oklahoma a continuing contract of the spring notification type 
governs the term of employment of the public school teacher. This plan 
requires that the teacher be notified by a specified date if his services 
are not desired for the following year; otherwise his contract continues 
automatically for another year. The responsibility for notification lies 
with the board of education. This type of continuing contract is dis-
tinguished from protective continuing contracts and permanent tenure 
arrangements chiefly by the fact that it permits dismissal of the teacher 
at the end of any year, with nQ !:)tatement of reason, provided the notifi-
, -·----------· ·-· _, -------<--~----.•-.- ~-~--- +-~--.;~--····-"·;o-,,,_.·.-_- . _ _. . 
cation has been made in accordance with the provision of the law. The 
discharged teacher legally is in the same position as one who never 
taught in the school system. 
Under the cormnon law and under the statutes of Oklahoma, generally 
teachers can be dismissed only for cause during their contract period, 
and as a rule they can be dismissed for no other reason. The assumption 
is that the enumeration of causes in the statute was intended to be 
exhaustive. If a board of education wishes to dismiss a teacher prior 
to the end of his contract, it must be able to prove in a hearing at 
least one or more of the following stipulated conditions for dismissal: 
l3J.srown v. Bowling, 56 N.M. 96, 240 P. (2d) 846, (1952). 
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immorality, willful neglect of duty, cruelty, incompetency, teaching 
disloyalty to the American Constitutional System of Government, or moral 
turpitude. l34 
However, a contract between a school district and a teacher might 
provide grounds for dismissal of the teacher in addition to statutory 
grounds.135 Also a school board may by contract reserve the right to 
dismiss a teacher for other than statutory causes.136 
Discharge for Refusal to Obey Rules and Regulations of the Board 
It is an accepted fact that boards of education have legal authority 
to adopt and enforce reas~nable rules and regulations for the operation 
of the school system. A public school teacher is bound to obey all 
reasonable rules and regulations of the board which employs him, and it 
makes no difference whether the rules were in force at the date of his 
employment or were promulgated at a later date. Moreover, a teacher by 
implication consents to obey all reasonable rules and regulations which 
a board may find it necessary to adopt from time to time in the adminis-
tration of the school system. 
An illustration of the authority of school boards to enforce 
reasonable rules and regulations is found in an Oklahoma case. At the 
opening of the school term the superintendent of schools assigned, as he 
was authori~d to do, a teacher to teach the fourth and fifth grades. 
Th.e teacher agreed to the assignment and entered upon the discharge of 
13.4consolidated School District No. iz, Bryan County v. Millis, 192 
Okla. ~87, 139 P. ( 2d) 182, (1943). 
l35school District No. 1...2 v. ~, IJ) Okla. 97, 136 Pac. 588, (1913). 
136school District No • .2ii: v. Gautier, 13 Okla. 194, 73 Pac. 954, (1903). 
___ .. --
her duties for about four days; then without authority or consent, she 
peremptorily took charge of the seventh grade and advised the superintendent 
that she would teach only that grade. After consultation with the county 
superintendent, the superintendent endeavored to persuade the teacher to 
perform her duties as teacher of the fourth and fifth grades, which she 
refused to do. Therefore, because she had failed to observe the rules 
and regulations of the district board, her dismissal was entered. 
The contract involved in this case at bar specifically provided 
that the teacher "· •• agrees in all things to observe the rules and 
regulations of the district board ••• 111.37 It was upon this provision of 
the contract that the superintendent contended that the teacher breached 
the contract in that, by failure to teach as directed, she failed and 
refused to observe the rules and regulations of the district board.1.38 
The law defines unprofessional conduct, in part, as persistent 
violation of school laws or reasonable board regulations. In California 
a teacher was dismissed on the ground that she persistently violated and 
refused to obey reasonable regulations of the school district. The board 
stated that she absented herself from school during school hours without 
permission and in violation of the rules. The board also stated that she 
engaged in unprofessional conduct in that she breached her contract by 
not reporting for the school term after being directed to do so. 
The first day of one of her absences the teacher secured a substitute 
but she remained away for two weeks. She stated she did not report for 
the beginning of the term nor did she teach during the term because of an 
l.37consolidated School District. No •. lt, Bryan County v. Millis, 192 
Okla. 687, 1.39 P. (2d) 18.3, (1943). 
l.3Sibid. 
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injury to her leg. However, evidence was introduced to the effect that 
during this period, from September to February, she attended to personal 
business. It was also shown that though she alleged that the injury 
occurred in July, she did not consult a doctor until September. The 
doctor testified that she could have taught with a knee bandage or with 
a cane or crutches. She did not request a leave of absence for health 
reasons. The court held that these actions constituted a breach of 
contract and unprofessional conduct.139 
On the other hand if a board makes an unreasonable rule or a rule 
in excess of its authority, the teacher is not bound thereby. Whether a 
rule is or is not reasonable is a matter to be determined by the courts. 
It was stated thus by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma: 
In the absence of a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of employ-
ment, a school teacher is not required to perform the substantial janitor 
work, such as carrying the fuel, making the fires and preparing the school 
building for occupancy during school hours; it is the duty of the school 
board, under such circumstances to not only furnish the building and 
equipment, but also to have the building made sufficiently comfortable 
and habitable that the teacher can discharge the duties she has con-
tracted to perform.140 . 
Dismissal of Teacher Because of Lack of Funds to Pay Salary 
A school board may not dismiss a teacher for lack of funds if it is 
legally possible to provide the necessary funds out of the revenue for 
the current year. Even the state legislature cannot by legislative act 
impair the obligations of a contract, and certainly a school district 
cannot. 
l39Board of Education of Richmond District v. Mathews, 308 P. ( 2d) 
449, (Pa.), (1957). -
140school Uistrict No.~ v. ~, 106 Okla. 172, 233 P. 427, (1925). 
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The Oklahoma constitution provides that a school district must confine 
its expenditures to the revenue of the current year$ contracts creating 
an indebtedness in excess of that revenue cannot be enforcedol,41. A 
school board cannotJ therefore 9 dismiss a teacher merely because it does 
not have on hand the funds with which to pay him. 'I'o do so the board 
must show that it had no legal authority to make the contract under law 
existing at the time the contract was made. 
An Oklahoma case will serve to illustrate the principle o 142 In the 
case 9 the statute prohibited school district boards from incurring an 
indebtedness in excess of the revenue appropriated for school purposes 
during any fiscal year. In making contracts with teachersJ the board 
of education kept within the current revenue but limited itself to $749 
for all other current expenses. Nevertheless~ it spent for other 
purposes a good portion of the funds which should have been set aside 
for salaries. When the school year was about half expired 9 all funds 
were exhausted. The courts held that the teachers could recover the 
amounts unpaid on their contracts. 
Certain conditions may arise~ however» under which teachers may be 
dismissed because of laok of funds. In Oklahoma 9 contracts creating an 
indebtedness in excess of the amount which the district may spend are 
ultra vires and void. Therefore 9 a teacher who is employed under such a 
contract may be dismissed when the funds which the district may legally 
spend are exha.usted. 
141oklahoma Constitution» Arto X$ Sec. XX\TL 
142t.fyers v. Independent School District Consolidated No. 1~ 104 
Okla. 51 ~ 230 P. 498 j) (1924) o 
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Disc.harge of Female Teachers Because of Marriage 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not passed on the legality of 
dismissing women teachers at the time of their marriage. A careful 
search of the statutes reveals that there is no prohibition against the 
employment of married persons as teachers. It is well known that married 
women have been employed as teachers in our public schools for so many 
years that their employment in this capacity must be deemed to have the 
approval of the Legislature. 
One legal encyclopedia states the following rule: 
In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, marriage of 
a woman teacher is not in itself ground for discharge; and under a 
statute giving the board power to discharge for reasonable grounds only, 
marriage in itself is held not to be a reasonable ground for discharge ••• 143 
Keezer, writing on Marriage and Divorce, states: 
It is generally held that statutes giving school boards the right 
to discharge a school teacher for reasonable cause confers no right to 
discharge a woman teacher because of marriage. The state may make this 
a ground for discharge but not the school boards of cities or school 
districts. To hold otherwise would be to give sanction to a restraint 
to marriage.144 
On January 26, 1940, the Secretary of the Board of Regents requested 
the Attorney General's opinion as to whether or not the Board of Regents 
of the University Preparatory School and Junior College at Tonkawa, 
Oklahoma, may legally terminate its contract of employment with a certain 
instructor, by reason of her marriage. 
143corpus Juris, LVI, (New York, 1932), Po 403. 
144Frank H. Keezer, ! 'l'reatise ,££~~.£! .. Marriage ~ Divorce 
(Indianapolis, 1923), Po 114. 
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On February 1, 1940, the Attorney General gave an opinion that 
agreements with public school teachers in restraint of ma'.rriage are unen-
forceable and void, because the same are contrary to public policy, 
which policy is stated in Section 9495, Oklahoma Statutes of 1931, which 
reads as follows: 
Every contract in restraint of the marriage of any person, other 
than a minor is void. Section 1995, supra, is a statement of public 
policy as to restraint upon marriage, and we do not believe any public 
body may properly adopt a policy contrary to that established by the 
Legislature. In our opinion, any agreement, either express or implied, 
of an instructor in a State institution not to marry during the term of 
any such instructor is a proper cause for his or her dismissal. 
We do not believe the policy of the Board of Regents of the Tonkawa 
institution against the continued employment of instructors who marry 
can legally operate to terminate a lawful contract of employment. 
You are advised, therefore, that the Attorney General is of the 
opinion that the marriage of the instructor referred to in your letter 
did not operate to terminate her said employment, and that the same is 
not a proper ground for discharging her from said employment.145 
On June 4, 1937, the County Attorney of Tulsa County asked the 
Attorney General's opinion whether or not a teacher teaching in Tulsa 
County can legally be dismissed by reason of the fact that she is married. 
On June 12, 1937, the Attorney gave his opinion that marriage does 
not constitute a 1tjust cause for a teacher's dismissal. 11146 
On November 22, 1937, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requested an opinion from the Attorney General regarding the validity of 
a clause in a teacher's contract which ·read: "It is expressly agreed and 
understood that if the party hereby employed marries during the life of 
this contract, the contract becomes null and void." 
145opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, February 1, 1940, 
addressed to Honorable Feliz C. Duvall, Secretary Board of Regents, 
University Preparatory School and Junior College (in the files of the 
office of the Attorney General). · 
146opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, June 12, 1937, 
addressed to Honorable Dixie Gilmer, County Attorney, Tulsa (in the 
files of the office of the Attorney General). 
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On November 24, 19.37, the Attorney General gave his opinion that the 
said clause relating to the marriage of the teacher is unenforceable and 
void, and that if the said contract is otherwise valid, the teacher is 
entitled to be paid for the time that she rendered services under said 
contract, regardless of the fact that she was married when such services 
were rendered.147 
It thus appears that the weight of authority supports the view that 
a provision in a teacher's contract, or a rule forbidding the marriage 
of a woman teacher is not a reasonable rule and is unenforceable. 
Dismissal of Female Teacher Because of the Birth of a Child 
The absence of a female teacher during confinement is not such 
neglect of duty as would authorize her dismissal. Since it is settled 
by the weight of authority in this state that a teacher may not be 
removed because of marriage, she certainly should not be dismissed 
because of the fact that she has given birth to a child. However, if a 
teacher is absent for a long period of time so that her work suffers 
unduly, she may be dismissed whether the absence is due to her confine-
mentor any other cause. Dismissal for this reason is not by way of 
punishment for some dereliction on the teacher's part, but rather to 
protect the school in its right to the services of competent teachers. 
In a North Dakota case a teacher contracted with a board of education 
to teach for a school term of nine months, and after teaching approximately 
four months of the term was forced to quit for a period of two months for 
147opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, November 24, 19.37, 
addressed to Honorable A. L. Crable, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
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the purpose of giving birth to a child.148 She was dismissed because 
she had failed substantially to perform her contract with the school 
district. The court said: 
A teacher under contract for personal service to teach a school 
cannot employ a substitute, nor require the school board to accept a sub-
stitute in the performance of services which she herself contracted to 
perform. 
A contract for personal services is discharged by such sickness on 
the part of the person by whom such services are to be rendered as to 
incapacitate him from performing them and performance is excused •••••.•• 
The contract in the case of her is the same kind of a contract an entire 
contract binding the plaintiff to teach the school in said school district 
for the school year of nine months. It is conceded that it was necessary 
for plaintiff to quit, that she could not carry on and perform her entire 
contract, and so far as the defendant was concerned it was no longer 
bound by the contract. The plaintiff's condition was such as to inca-
pacitate he:r from performing her contract obligation, and under the . 
authorities cited the contract was discharged, and performance excused • 
••• The plaintiff was not dismissed; she quit because of her physical 
condition and approaching illness prevented her from performing her 
contract. All her rights under her contract ceased and determined when 
she quit her employment. She no longer had a contract, and as a matter 
of course she is not entitled to recover for that portion of the school 
term taught by the substitute teacher.149 
Similarly in a Minnesota case the court held: 
A teacher's contract, in ordinary form, entered into with a school 
district, is a contract for personal services by the teacher, and is an 
entire contract for the period covered. 
The physical inability of a teacher to commence her services at the 
beginning of the school year, and for over five weeks thereafter, is 
such failure of performance of a substantial and material part of the 
contract as to release the school district therefrom, in the situation 
shown here,150 
On October 17, 1936, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether a teacher could be 
148Auren v. Mentor School District No. 1, 58 N.D. 934, 233 N.W. 
644, (1930). 
149Ibid. 
1 5'1-Iong v. Independent School District No.~, 181 Minn. 309, 232 
N .W. 329, (1930), 
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discharged because of the birth of a childo He al.so enclosed with his 
request an opinion written by the late Honorable R. Eo Wood 9 Assistant 
Attorney General. This opinion~ of February 241 1919, stated: 
Since it is a general principle of contract law that 1if a party to 
a contract 9 either before the time for performance or in the course of 
performance~ makes performance» or further performance~ by him impossiblej 
the other party is discharged' we are wondering if your office still 
adheres to the opinion referred too 
The State Superintendent went on to ask for an interpretation of 
Mro Wood us opinion. The fa<.9ts of t,he opinion were as follows& 
Mrs. Sims)) a gra.dua te of Southeastern Normal 9 was employed at the town of 
Blue to fill the unexpired term of a teacher who resigned last year. 
Later she contracted to teach for the present school year. After she 
gave birth to a child» it was the feeling of the board that she should 
resign her position 9 or that her contract should be legally terminated. 
During her confinement, she furnished an adequate substitute. 
The Attorney General held that "these facts ttwould not justify can= 
oellation by the school board of its contract with Mrso Sims and that in 
the absence of a:n:y specific charges covered by statute 9 she should be per~ 
mi tted unmolestedly to execute her contract with the school board. n~ 
On October 23j 1936~ the Attorney General gave his opinion as follows: 
It will be noted that in said opinion the question was whether a 
teacher could be dismissed merely because the school board felt that she 
would be unable to give proper attention to her duties in the futureo We 
believe that the conclusion reached therein is correct, insofar as the 
dismissal of a teacher for the reason stated is concerned 9 and in this 
connection call your attention to the case of Gardner v. North Little 
Roe k Special School Di strict 9 161 Ark. 466 9 278 S. vi. 7 '3 ';I in which it was 
held g 1The directors of. a school district have no right to discharge 
a teacher or superintendent wi thou.t just grounds existent at the time of 
the discharge~ a bare fear that they may arise in the future being 
insufficiento i 
How~~ we believe that a school district can be released from 
liability under a contract of employment between the school district and 
a teacher, where the teacher becomes ill by reason of her pregnant con-
dition~ and is unable to continue teaching under said contracto 
Therefore we adhere to the aforementioned opinionj in so far as it 
holds that said teacher could not legally be dismissed merely because the 
school board believed that she would be unable to give proper attention 
to her duties in the f'utureo However$ if a teacher has failed to 
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substantially perform her contract with a school district, we are of the 
opinion that the school district is thereby released from further liability 
under said contract, and that it is not required to thereafter permit 
said teacher to resume teaching thereunder. Whether or not there has 
been such non-performance as will operate to discharge a contract depends 
upon the circumstances of each particular case.151 
Dismissal for Incompetency 
Incompetency is a valid ground for dismissal at common law and under 
the statutes of Oklahoma. When a teacher accepts a position to teach 
there is an implied agreement that he is prepared to perform the duties 
required of the position, both as to academic knowledge required and as 
to the ability to control the classroom. 
An Indiana case contains the following statement on this point: 
••• When he, (the teacher), accepts such employment, (i.e. employment 
as a teacher), he agrees by implication that.he bas the learning necessary 
to enable him to teach the branches required, as well as that he has the 
capacity in a reasonable degree of imparting that learning to others; he 
agrees also that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the 
advancement of his pupils in their studies, and in preserving harmony, 
order, and discipline.152 
If, therefore, the teacher fails in ar.w of these particulars, he may 
be dismissed. However, an average teacher or one who does not fail.too 
often or too seriously and who puts forth a reasonable effort is considered 
competent in the sight of the law. The term "incompetency" is not a 
clearly defined one. It was said by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: 
"A relative term without technical meaning. It may be employed as 
15lopinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, October 23, 1936, 
addressed to Honorable A. L~ Crable, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (:1.n the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
152 Crawfordsville v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200, (1873). 
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meaning disqualification; inability; incapacity; lack of abilityi legal 
qualification~ or fitness to discharge the required duty o 11153 
The Oklahoma statute expressly states that incompetency is a valid 
cause for the discharge of a teacher, but the statute does not define 
the termo154 
Decisions on conduct outside the school which obviously renders the 
teacher unfit for continuance in his position have been rendered in many 
stateso It was held in Pennsylvania that a teacher who served as a waitress 
in her husband 1 s beer garden after school hours and during vacations 9 took 
an occasional drink of.JSeer ~ ser1red beer to customers and occasionally 
shook dice for drinksll might be dismissed for 11incompetenceo 11 The court 
found that such conduct caused her to lose the respect which was 
necessary for carrying on her work as a teacher. 155 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the action of the board in 
discharging a teacher who had been employed for a definite period. The 
grounds of her discharge 1 were the followingg (1) She had a quick temper 
and sharp tongue, (2) she was unable to maintain discipline; (3) she 
refused to obey orders of her principal.$ insulted him~ and otherwise 
showed disrespect in the presence of pupils; (4) she failed to keep 
order in her classroom; and (5) humiliated. her pupilso The court held 
that if these charges were proved~ they were sufficient to establish 
incompetency as a ground for dischargeol56 
l5Jaorosko Vo School District of Mount Pleasant Ilil2,., 335 Pa. 369 9 
6A (2d) 866, (1939h 
l54oos. 1951, 70:6=2o 
l55ttorosko v. School District 9f Mount Pleasant '.!Jm•j 335 Pao 369» 
6A (2d) 866, (1939). . 
l56crownover v. Al.read School District No. 1, 211 Arkoj 449 9 
200 s.w. (2d) 809~ (1947). 
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By accepting a teaching position, the teacher thereby represents 
that he possesses a reasonable degree of skill and learning, that he will 
be diligent in the execution of his work and has reasonable ability to 
discipline and .control his class. Whether the teacher meets these 
standards is a question of fact to be determined by the legal trier of 
the facts, and the burden of proof is upon those who assert that the 
teacher has fallen short of bis obligations.157 
Inclusion of physical disability under incompetence has been held. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania went so far as to sustain a dismissal 
on the ground of incompetence in the case of a pregnant teacher. The 
court's opinion included the following: 
Pregnancy constitutes I incompetency I under the Te.acher I s Tenure Act 
and justifies termination of contract on that ground, since it renders 
teachers physically incapable to discharge her duties. 
Incompetency as ground for dismissal of teacher under the Teacher's 
Tenure Act is not limited in meaning to lack of substantive knowledge of 
the subjects to be taught, but embraces ~~o a disqualification, an 
incapacity, or want of physical ability. 
On December 9, 1952, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requested the Attorney General's opinion on the following inquiry: 
A married teacher in one of the schools in southern Oklahoma is 
expecting a child. She has been advised by the attending physician that 
she should not undertake teaching duties past December 10, 1952. If 
such teacher should refuse to resign upon request, does the Board of 
:&lucation possess the power to dismiss her on the ground that her physical 
condition is such that she should not be permitted to teach? 
On December 13, 1952, the Attorney General gave an opinion that the 
Board of Education of said Independent School District may in the manner 
l57School District !g • ..'2Q v. !!Q.:th, 115 Ark. 606, 170 S.W. 561, (1914). 
158west M,ahoney Township School .. _Qm. v. Kelley, 156 Pa. 601, 
Lil A (2d) 3M., (1945). . 
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prescribed by law, legally dismiss ~aid teacher because of her pregnant 
condi tion.159 
This statute provides that 
upon hearing as hereinafter provided any teacher may be dismissed at any 
time for imrnoralityj willful neglect of duty» cruelty, incompetency» 
teaching disloyalty to the American Constitutional system of government 9 
or any reason involving moral turpi tude.160 ·· 
Dismissal for Neglect of Duty 
Under the common law and under statutes providing for dismissal of 
teachers for neglect of duty 9 what constitutes neglect of duty is not 
always clearly set down. The courts have not attempted to define it. 
If there is no specific statutory provision)) "neglect of duty" constitutes 
> 
"other good and just cause'' for dismissa.lo In determining what constitutes 
neglect sufficient for dismissal 9 the court has decided that among other 
possible kinds of neglect 9 frequent ·tardiness has been held a justifiable 
ground for disrnissai.161 Also temporary absence without sufficient causej 
failure to make required reports, and in one instancej failure to cata-
logue the library as directed)) constitute such neglect of duty • 
.Although the teacher has a right to employ a substitute in an 
emergency, she does not have the right to employ such a substitute in 
order to lengthen her vacation period. In an Illinois case a teacher 
employed a substitute to teach for her three days before the school was 
to be dismissed for a vacation of several days.162 The teacher had no 
l59opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma» December 13, 19529 
addressed to Honorable Oliver Hodge 9 State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General). 
160 
o.s. 1951, 70a6-2. 
161school Directors of District No.! v. Birchg 93 Ill. App. 499 9 
(1900). 
162school Directors v. Hudson 9 88 Ill. 563~ (1878). 
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excuse for her action. She relied solely upon her right to employ a 
substitute teacher to do her work. In holding that the teacher had 
broken her contract, the court pointed out that the contract was for 
personal services and could not be fulfilled by employing a substitute. 
The court said, however, that: 
A temporary absence of a short time, with the temporary substitution 
of another competent teacher, might not, under certain circumstances, 
constitute such a breach of contract as would authorize the employers to 
consider the contract at an end. The circumstances might be such that a 
teacher would be warranted in assuming the approval thereof, or the 
consent thereto by the employers, without any express consent.163 
The test is not whether the absence is avoidable but rather whether 
it is of such duration that goes to the essence of the contract. That is, 
does the absence deprive the district of a substantial part of the services 
to which it was entitled under the contract? Not every neglect of duty, 
however small, will justify dismissal. For example, a delay in reporting 
for the opening of school which is due to illness or to traffic delays is 
not sufficient cause for dismissal. 
Dismissal for Immorality 
Among the express or implied legal bases for discharging a teacher 
in Oklahoma before the end of bis contract period is immorality. The 
peculiar relationship between the teacher and his pupils is such that it 
is highly important that the character of the teacher be above reproach. 
Black defines immorality as " ••• that conduct which is willful, flagrant, 
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of 
the good and respectable members of the community. ul64 
l6.3Ibid. 
164Henry Campbell Black, Black' sLaw Dictionary (St. Paul, 1951), 
p. 885. 
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Few cases of sex immorality among teachers have come before the 
courtso However, this does not mean that teachers have not been dismissed 
on charges of immorality. In one dismissal the court held that 11immorali ty 
is not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality," that 11i t 
may be such a course of conduct as to offend the morals of the community ,II 
and be 11a bad example for the youths whose ideals a teacher is supposed 
to fos,ter and elevateo nl65 In this same case it was held that conduct 
which is contrary to the mores of the community may be considered immoral. 
In further commenting on the conduct required of teachers, the 
Court said; 
o•oit has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct him-
self in such a way as to command the respect and good will of the community, 
though one result of the choice of a teacher's vocation may be to deprive 
him of the same freedom of action enjoyed by persons in other vocations. 
Educators have always regarded the example set by the teacher as of 
great importance, particularly in the education of the children in the 
lower grades •• 0 11 
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has said that both parents and 
pupils regard the teacher as an exemplar whose conduct might be followed 
by his pupils, and the law by necessary intent demands that he should not 
engage in conduct which would invite criticism and aus.picions of immorality. 
Even charges of or reputation for immorality, although not supported by 
full proof, might in some cases be sufficient ground for removal. Not 
m~rely good character but good reputation is essential to the greatest 
usefulness of the teacher in the schools.166 For example, the indictment 
of a superintendent of schools for adultery, followed by conviction, is 
sufficient grounds for his dismissal even though the conviction is 
165ttorosko v. School District. of Mount Pleasant .!:::£E.., 335 Pa. 369, 
6A ( 2d) 8 66, ( 19 39) • 
166Gover v. Stovall, 237 Ky. 172, 35 S.W. (2d) 24, (1931). 
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subsequently set aside.167 Thus we find that a teacher need not necessar-
ily be guilty of immorality to furnish a basis of discharge for that 
reason. It is enough that he has a reputation for it. 
Disch!µ'ge for Moral Turpitude 
One of the grounds of dismissal authorized by statute in Oklahoma 
is moral turpitude on the part of the teacher. There is not any reported 
case in this state in which a public school teacher has been dismissed 
on this ground. In an Oklahoma case having to do with the disbarment of 
an attorney upon conviction of a misdemeanor, the court defined moral 
turpitude as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good 
morals.168 
In another case involving the faiiure of a book store ,to perform 
its obligation under a contract the court said: 
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity 
in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or 
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of 
right and duty between man and man.169 
One legal encyclopedia states the following in respect to moral 
turpi tud.e: 
Embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote 
moral turpitude; and as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an 
element are looking on as involving moral turpitude. Thus, concealing 
assets in bankruptcy, obtaining goods on false representations, and 
other crim~s involving fraud are usually regarded as showing moral 
turpitude.~70 · · 
') 1,!,, ,· l.,i!_:;.: l . l 
167Freeman v. !£}:m of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 49 N.E. 435, (1898). 
168williams et al., 64 Okla. 316, 167 P. 1149, (1917). 
l69National Casualty Co. v. Sipes, 180 Okla. 548, 71 Pac. (2d) 459, 
(1937) 0 ' 
170coryus ~ Secundum, LVIII, American Law Book Co., Brooklyn, 
N. Y. (1952 • 
The courts, in interpreting the meaning of moral turpitude, are 
inclined to hold school officials to a stricter definition than is 
apparently true for most public officers. In Georgia, for example, a 
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county superintendent was found guilty of moral turpitude on the grounds 
that he had been convicted on a plea of guilty of presenting false claims 
against the United States government, even though he was never sentenced 
171 for the offense. The court considered that the maximum amount of the 
fine possible for this offense ($10,000) and the maximum penal term 
(five years) were important considerations in determining whether or not 
the superintendent Os actions were "immoral. 11 
Dismissal of Teachers for Acts Committed During Previous Years 
On August 24, 1954.11 the State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether or not the board 
of education of an independent school district can dismiss a teacher , 
during the current contractual year for acts done by such teacher during 
the previous contractual year. The teacher in question had been employed 
for ten years by this school district. 
On September 1, 1954, the Attorney General gave his opinion: 
It appears from your letter that the suggested dismissal would be 
under the provisions of 70 o.s. 1951, 6-2 which provides: 
'Upon hearing as hereinafter provided, any teacher may be dismissed 
at any time for immorality, willful neglect of duty, cruelty, incom-
petency, teaching disloyalty to the .American Constitutional system of 
government, or any reason involving moral turpitude. 
It has been held that a public officer cannot be removed from 
office for acts committed during a previous term. State v. Blake, 1.38 
Okla. 241, 280 P. 833; Board Qf Com'rs. of Kingfisher County v. Shutler, 
139 Okla. 52 1 281 P. 222.' 
171Huff v. Anderson, 90 S.E. (2d) 329, (Ga.), (1955). 
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It is believed that the above quoted provisions are prospective, 
and not retroactive 9 :Ln their application, We think that a fair analysis 
· of said provisions results in the conclusion that the statutory grounds 
for disrni ssal must occur after the teacher has been employed o We think 
that the authorization for dismissal for immorality 9 etco 9 has reference 
to acts of imrnorality 9 etc.~ that might occur after the individual in= 
volved has entered into a contract as a teacher for the then current 
fiscal year. In other words 9 these provisions refer to a 1 teacher 9 ° and 
a person does not become a teacher of the district :for the current year 
until he has entered into a contract for such year; and so we think 
that said provisions for dismissal have reference to conditions that 
become existent after the individual concerned signs a contract as a 
teacher of the d:l.strfot. 
Therefore 9 the Attorney General concludes that your inquiry must be 
answered in the nega-tive 9 that Jts 9 the board of education of an independent 
school district cannot dismiss a teacher during the current contractual 
year for acts done by such teacher during t.he previous contractual year 9 
unless the district Os ,wntract wi·th the teacher expressly provides for 
such dismissalol72 
Teacher May Wi·thdraw His Resignation Before Acted Upon 
A resignation that has only been tendered does not act to terminate a 
c:ontracto It has been held that where a school board votes to remove a 
teacher~ it cannot delegate to the superintendent the authority to accept 
the teachers resignationo ThusJ> where a teacherj) under such circn.llllstances 9 
presented her resigna.tion to the superintendent who purportedly accepted 
it~ the court held that he could later withdraw it 9 in the absence of 
evidence that the board had ta.ken official action to accept i to l ?3 
If a teacher resigns and the resignation is accepted 9 the teacher 
cannot thereafter change his mind and claim the positiono If another 
teacher is employed to take his place 9 the teacher making the replacement 
1720pinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma 9 September lJ 19549 
addressed to Honorable Oliver Hodge 9 State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (in the files of the office of the Attorney General)o 
173ttueman Vo Indepeng_~ School District Noo 77 9 67 N oWo (2d) 38 9 
(Minn.) 9 (1954) o 
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is entitled to the position. On the other hand, a teacher may rescind 
his resignation if he does so before the board has acted upon it. 
If a school board accepts a resignation and the teacher is released 
by mutual consent, there is no breach of contract ,on the part of the 
teacher. Any contract may be terminated by mutual consent, precluding 
axry claims on either side thereaftero 
A teacher may also withdraw his resignation before it is acted upon 
by the school boardo In an Iowa case the court held: · 
The tender of a 'resignation' by a teacher under a contract to teach 
in a certain district, being a mere o£fer 11 is :r;tot binding on either party· 
to the contract until accepted, and may be withdrawn at any time before 
it is acted on by the district board. 
The fact that a tender of a resignation by a teacher under contract 
to teach in a district was handed to the president of the district board 11 
and retained by him, did not constitute an a!~~ptance thereof, where it 
remained for the board to act on the tender. 4 
A West Virginia court saids 
The tender of a so-called 'resignation' by a ,teacher under contract 
to teach in a district school, being a mere offer to effect a mutual 
recision of a contract employment, is not binding to either party to the 
contract until its acceptance by her employer, assembled as a bo~~, and 
may be withdrawn at any time before such acceptance takes place. 
i 
On August 20, 19.37, the County Attorney of Marshall County requested 
an opinion as to whether a certain teacher's contract has been terminated 
under the following statement of factsi 
One of the School Districts in Marshall County, Oklahoma, the School 
Board had employed Mrso Smith to teach in school for the year of 1937-JS, 
or, rather, for the current school year and the contract was approved by 
the director, the Member and the Clerk, also, by the County Superintendent 
of Public Instruction. The school will open about September 6th. Approxi-
mately two or three weeks prior to the writing of this letter, Mrs. Smith 
l7.4curtwright v. Indeyendent School District of Center Junction, 
ill Iowa 20, S2 N.W. 444, 1900). 
175:t.eMasters v. Board of Education of Grant District, 105 W. Va. 81 1 
141 S.E. 515, (1928).~ ~ ~ 
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decided that she mi ght move t o West ern Oklahoma, however 1 she was not 
certain and she went to the director at his home and told him that she 
wanted to resign, that she thought she was going to move to Western Okla-
homa and the director agreed that i t was perfectly all righto There 
was not a written resignation. Then, the next day j Mrs. Smith went back 
to the director and asked him, 1If the school board had approved or 
accepted another contract for her place j 1 and the director stated that 
they had not , but had several applications on file. Mrs. Smith , then p 
asked the director for permission to withdraw her resignation and the 
director consented to this and tol d her t hat it was perfectly agreeable. 
Then, Mrso Smith went to the home of another member of the school board 
and left word with his wife that she had withdrawn her resignationo A 
few days later the school board approved the contract of another teacher 
and I advised the County Superintendent not to approve this contract , 
until I could hear from you. 
On August 25 , 1937, the Attor ney General gave his opinion~ 
You express the opinion that Mrs . Smith st ill has a valid and legal 
contract to teach in sai d school district. Section 6814, Oklahoma 
Statutes 1931 , contains the followi ng provisiong 
'Whenever any pers on shall make and enter into a valid contract with 
such district board to teach school in such district » such contract shall 
be binding upon such teacher until he has been legall y discharged there-
from accor ding to law or released t herefrom E,;L such district board in 
regular session.' 
In view of t he for egoing , we ar e of the opinion that t ender of the 
purported 1 r esignation ° to the director of the School Board , and 
acceptance the r eof by said direct or without any official action of the 
School Board , did not operate to tenni nate the contract of Mrs. Smith 
and release her therefr om. We beli eve t hat said 'resignati on, ' having 
been withdr awn bef ore its acceptance i n the manner prescr i bed by 
Section 6814, supr a , cannot be the basi s for a recision of said teacher ' s 
contract . Therefore , assumi ng that said contract of Mrs. Smith was 
regularly made , we concur i n your opinion t hat s ame has n9t6been rescinded 
and is still binding on bot h her and t he school districto17 
Right of Discharged Teacher t o Heari ng 
It is basic in phi losophy of t he American law that an individual 
shall not be condemned , or other legal action taken against him » without 
his being affor ded the opportunit y of being heard in hi s own behalfo 
176opi nion of the Attor ney General of Oklahoma , August 25 , 1937, 
addressed to Honorable Sam Yo Col by j County Attorney » Marshall County 
(in the fi l es of the offi ce of the Att or ney General). 
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This right to a hearing is a very important one which the courts zealously 
protect. 
The Oklahoma Statute expressly provides that a hearing shall b.e 
required and that legal action can be taken only after a hearing. The 
procedure also requires that written charges be filed, that notice of 
the charges and the hearing must be presented to the person charged, and 
that legal counsel must be permitted if the person charged desires it. 
The procedure for hearing complaints against a teacher is defined 
as followl3: 
•••• Said notice shall contain a statement of the charges upon which a 
hearing is sought and by whom brought. The teacher complained of shall 
be notified of the date of the hearing which shall not be less than 
ten (10) days from the date of said notice. The teacher shall be 
entitled to be present and to be represented by counsel •••• In independent 
school districts it shall be before the board of education of such 
district. In all cases a majority vote of those constituting the board, 
before which said hearing is held, shall be required in order to convict 
the teacher charged •••• Provided in cases involving incompetency or 
neglect of duty, the decision arrived at at said hearing shall be final 
and those involving moral turpitude an appeal may be taken to the district 
court of the county.177 
Boards of education occasionally act in a very arbitrary fashion in 
discharging teachersj and such acts are seldom sustained by the courts. 
Such was a case in Minnesota involving an attempt by the board to dis-
charge a teacher during the term of her contract. The following letter 
was written to the teacher, and signed by all members of the boards 
Miss Kuehns 
We, the school board, hereby give you notice that you have 
by all means, not lived up to your contract as you have agreed to •••• 
You have been told ••• that your teaching was not satisfactory. 
You have not followed your rules and school regulations 
according to laws. 
You have not put in your school classes, you have left out 
classes days and days. 
177 o.s. 1951 9 70s6-2. 
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You have not put in full hours at school which is required by 
law for teachers to do. 
Therefore we expel you as a teacher of district 70. 
(Signed by the board) 
No hearing was granted the teacher on these charges against her, and she 
sued for the balance of her salary. The Minnesota law did not require a 
hearing. The jury in the lower court gave judgment in the teacher's 
favor apparently deciding that the board's action was arbitrary and 
capricious or in bad faith. The Supreme Court of Minnesota sustained 
the judgment for the teacher on the ground that she was not granted a 
hearing. The Court said: 
The statutes do not provide a procedure for the removal of a non-
tenure teacher 'for cause.' However, even though no method of procedure 
is set out in the statute ••• a teacher is, nevertheless, entitled to 
notice of ~barges against him and a fair hearing before an impartial 178 board ••• 
The Duty of a Wrongfully Discharged Teacher to Seek 
or Accept Another Position 
When one party to a contract breaks it, the other party has an 
immediate claim for damages or other relief. In damage actions, to state 
the rule very proadly, the party who did not break the contract is 
entitled to recover the amount of damages the breach caused him. However, 
the innocent party may not 9 under the law, enhance his damages. On the 
contrary he is obliged to take reasonable action to mitigate them. 
Under this rule~ an illegally discharged teacher is not entitled to sit 
idly by and recover his salary but is required to make reasonable efforts 
to procure another position. However, he is not obliged to accept a 
position of less dignity and standing than the one from which he is 
178Kuehn v. School District No. 70, 221 Minn. 443, 22 N.W. (2d) 
220)) (1946). 
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illegally discharged. The question as to what types of work will, by 
the courts, be held to be not inferior to teaching may be a difficult 
one in some cases. The law also recognizes that some teaching positions 
are inferior to others. Furthermore, a teacher is not obliged to accept 
a position in a distant cormnunity in order to mitigate the damages. 
A teacher who does not challenge the reasons of the school board in 
dispensing with his services cannot recover salary for the remainder of 
the year as fixed in his contract of employment, although he had not been 
notified of a hearing and no charges were filed with him. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has stated this rule: 
The measure of plaintiff's recovery in an action for breach of a 
contract for employment is prima facie the sum stipulated to be paid by 
the employer for the services, but it is subject to reduction in such 
sums as the plaintiff has earned or might with reasonable diligence have 
earned during the period by securing other employment of a similar 
character but the plaintiff is neither required to allege nor prove that 
he has been unable to secure other employment. The burden is upon the 
defendant to plead and prove in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff 
has, or might with reasonable diligencr79ave, obtained profitable employ-
ment during the remainder of the term. 
It is important to note that in mitigation of damages, the burden 
is upon the board to prove that the teacher in question did not use 
reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages, rather than the burden being 
upon the teacher to prove that he did use such reasonable efforts. 
A single case will illustrate the operation of the mitigation of 
damages rule. A teacher in an Oklahoma district was held to have been 
illegally discharged. 
The court stated: 
It is agreed that the defendant board paid to the plaintiff the sum 
of $733.34 prior to his wrongful discharge. Thus, the utmost recovery 
179sohool District Ne. 60 of~ County v. Crabtree, 146 Okla. 
197, 294 Pac. 171; (19.30Y:-
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under the breached contract was $1,625. In mitigation of damages, it 
appears that plaintiff was employed during the remainder of the school 
year at Yale, Okla., in a similar capacity and received the gross sum of 
$875. However, the plaintiff proved a reasonable expense in the amount 
of $100 in moving from Pond Creek to Yale. Likewise, he showed the 
expense of the employment of a substitute teacher for one week in the 
amount of $25. It is our view that these are reasonable deductions to 
be allowed from the total sum, in mitigation of damages, thus leavin!8 
the balance to be adjudged in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $875. O 
An interesting case arose in a Pennsylvania district where a teacher 
was illegally discharged. It was agreed at the trial in the lower court 
that the teacher had been employed as a teacher elsewhere during the period 
in question at a salary higher than that provided in the contract with 
the district which had illegally discharged him. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that the teacher was entitled only to nominal damages 
and awarded him $1.00. In its opinion that court quoted the following 
reasoning to the lower court: 
To set off or credit, against the salary owing to an improperly 
dismissed teacher, compensation earned by the teacher from other 
employers during the period of such improper dismissal does not in any 
way abate the salary or compensation to which he is entitled under his 
contract for he receives that salary or compensation, either wholly from 
the school district or wholly or partly from otherso He is in exactly 
the same position, so far as compensation is concerned, as if he had not 
been improperly dismissed. Improper dismissal is a breach of contract 
for which the employee may recover damages. Damages are the loss 
suffered by one person by reason of a breach of contract on the part of 
another and if the school teacher received the same compensation for his 
work during the period of improper dismissal as he would have received 
if he had continued in the position from which he was improperly dismissed, 
he has suffered no damages except such as may arise from matters following 
other elements than loss of salary.181 
180Ray v. Board of Education of ~ Creek, 194 Okla. 472, 153 P. 
( 2d) 233, (1944). 
181coble v. School District of Twp. of Metal, 178 Pa. 301, 116··A. 
(2d) 113, (1955). 
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Lach es 
Laches, in a legal sense, is delay that works a disadvantage to 
another and causes change of condition or relation during the period of 
delayo182 Although a dismissed teacher has a remedy available if he acts 
promptly, this remedy may be lost if the teacher fails to act in a 
reasonable time. It is frequently held, in fact, that a teacher who does 
not act promptly is guilty of laches and not entitled to recovery. There 
is no set rule for determining when one is guilty of laches. A Kentucky 
court has held that delay, although unreasonable, will not sustain the 
defense of 11estoppel by laches" unless such delay has worked a disadvantage 
to another. 183 A teacher who is barred from recovery of salary because 
of laches is also barred from any rights of reinstatement to position. 
A New York Court has ruled: 
No sufficient excuse appears in the record for the long delay in 
the institution of this proceeding after the decision of the court and, 
were there no other ground for denying the petitioner 1s application, 
the denial would be justified by her laches. In view of the many cases 
of resignations and the time which has elapsed, it would greatly embarrass 
the authorities of a city who have charge of public education if all who 
have resigned could be reinstated upon the mere suggestion that in 
resigning as teachers they did so upon the assurance of their supervisors 
that they could be forced out of their places by yirtue of the by-laws, 
and that such assurance constituted legal duress. 84 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has ruled that a school nurse who 
had been wrongfully dismissed almost seven years before and sued to 
obtain an order requiring her reinstatement and recovery of damages had 
waited too long to bring the suit and was guilty of laches •185 On appeal, 
182Jones v. McNabb, 184 Okla. 9, 84 P. (2d) 429, (1938). 
lB.3Culton v. Asher, 149 Ky. 659, 149 S.W. 946, (1912). 
184Grendon Vo Board of Education, 114 App. Div. 759, 100 N. Y. Supp. 
253' (1906) 0 
181iaas v. Llewellynj 135 A. (2d) 754, (Pa.), (1957). 
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the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the decision of the lower court, 
stating that even if her employment had been illegally terminated, her 
failure to complain or assert her ri{#lts for almost seven years barred 
her claims. 
Summary 
The authority to employ teachers in Oklahoma is vested in the board 
of education of a local school district. Implied in that right of power 
is the authority to dismiss those employed. In Oklahoma the legislature 
has enacted statutory provision covering the dismissal of a teacher and 
the board 1 s right to dismiss is dependent upon the statutory prescription. 
The Oklahoma statute lists the causes for dismissal, and generally 
speaking the board cannot dismiss for other causes not enumerated. The 
statute.also sets up the mode or method of dismissal, and the mode 
becomes the measure of the board I s power. In Oklahoma the weight of 
authority is that teachers' contracts in restraint of marriage are void 
as against public policy. The Oklahoma statute provides that a teacher 
has the right to an impartial hearing if wrongfully dismissed. 
A discharged teacher should seek other employment, and a board of 
education will be permitted to deduct whatever it can be shown the 
teacher earned or could have earned at other employment of the same 
kind. In this connection the burden of showing what the teacher earned 
or might have earned is on the board of education. A teacher must seek 
other employment in order to mi ti gate the damages. However, he need not 
accept work of a nature fundamentally different from that which he had 
agreed to perform under the contract. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The study was concerned wi.th the legal status of the public school 
teacher in Oklahoma insofar as that status is governed by basic law, 
Oklahoma Statutes, judicial interpretations, opinions of the Attorney 
General of the State of Oklahoma, and the rules and regulations of the 
Oklahoma State Department of Education. 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the laws, court decisions, 
and administrative regulations of bodies governing schools and to present 
an orderly summary of such laws 9 regulations» and interpretations as they 
affect the legal rights and responsibilities of teachers. 
The methodology used was a method similar to that used by members 
of the law profession in studying questions of law. Pertinent information 
obtained from statutory law, judicial decisions, Attorney General's 
opinions, State Department of Education rules and regulations, and 
provisions of Constrtutions pertaining to each particular area of study 
was assembled and grouped accordingly. 
The legal status of public-school teachers is not only outlined 
and established by state laws, but it is also circumscribed by judicial 
interpretation of these laws. Thus the profession is limited to those 
legally qualified, who hold evidence of that legal qualification in the 
form of a certificate, license, or credential. The method of appointing 
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teachers and the contracts of employment to be given them establish for 
teachers a legal status. Many other types of statutes concern the teacher 
during his career. Retirement laws assure him at least a modest income 
for life when he is relieved from service. 
Although the duties of a school teacher are said to be purely 
secular, a teacher in a public school is under an implied duty to guard 
the morals of the children entrusted in his care. Teachers stand somewhat 
in place of the parents in training the minds and shaping the moral 
character of their pupils. They must endeavor to maintain good discipline 
over all pupils under their charge, and to guard their physical and mental 
welfare in the classrooms, on field trips, or on the playgrounds, during 
the period in which the pupils are in their charge. A teacher may be 
personally liable in damages for injuries directly and proximately sus-
tained by pupils under their care. 
In accepting employment as a teacher, a person agrees to perform 
his labors and duties under the control and direction of the board of 
education, and in conformity to the proper rules and regulations of the 
board. He is required to perform all duties that are included within 
the scope of his employment as a teacher, subject to the control and 
direction of the board, and may be required to perform additional duties, 
in the manner provided by law. A teacher is not required to do the 
janitor work in any classroom, or render any services beyond the scope 
of employment as a teacher, except as may be mutually agreed on, and for 
compensation in addition to that received by him for his normal duties 
as teacher. 
Teachers are required to keep records showing the names of all 
pupils enrolled in the course or grade under their supervision, the studies 
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pursued, the character and reports of the work done, the standing of 
each pupil, and such other information as may be required by the board 
of education, the superintendent of schools, or the State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction. 
In Oklahoma there are statutory provisions enumerating the specific 
ground upon which a board of education m~ discharge teachers. A 
teacher is entitled to a hearing before hem~ be dismissed from his 
position. A wrongfully discharged teacher is obliged to seek another 
position in order to mitigate, that is, lessen, the damages which the 
district may be required to pay him as a result of his wrongful discharge. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations are offered: 
1. With the enactment of a greatly increased amount of legislation 
relating to the public schools in Oklahoma, the Sc~ool Gode has become 
exceedingly complex and cumbersome. Many compilations of our school 
· 1aws are of little value to those who must, or should be, primarily con-
earned with them. New laws, as enacted., are frequently inserted in the 
School Gode without much thought given to the logical organization of 
/ 
the code. As a result, it becomes almost impossible for one not well 
acquainted with the statutes of Oklahoma to find these pertinent to a 
particular subject. These compilations should be reorganized so that the 
layman and professional educator may, with some degree of assurance, know 
where and how to find the statutes dealing with a particular subject. 
This would result in bringing about a high degree of uniformity which 
would be of particular value to one doing research that involved 
consulting the School Code of Oklahoma. 
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2. The business of education has become so large that it is unfair 
to impose on public school teachers the risks involved in their respective 
positions. At least four states---Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, 
and Wyoming---have enacted so-called "save harmless" statutes for the 
protection of teachers. These laws require or permit districts to pay 
judgments recovered against teachers. They also require or permit 
districts to defend teachers in suits against them for damages caused by 
their negligent acts while in the course of their teaching duties. 
Frequently school employees have no money or property upon which a 
judgment can be executed. Furthermore, the members of the teaching pro-
fession should not be harassed by the possibility of judgments arising 
out of the conduct of their work. It is true that cases in which damages 
are collected from teachers are extremely rare. Modern jury awards run 
high, and even the successful defense of lawsuits is expensive. Teachers 
in Oklahoma should be given this protection if they are to carry on their 
duties effectively and not over-cautiously. The Oklahoma Fnucation 
Association should encourage the state legislature to enact such laws. 
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